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ABORIGINAL RIGHTS LAW, YEAR IN REVIEW:
THE 1995-96 TERM
LEONARD I. ROTMAN*
RtsuMt,
L'auteur analyse cinq importantes causes en mati~re de droit autochtone qui ont
6t6 rendues publiques en 1995-96. Elles portaient notamment sur la
determination de I'appartenance une bande et du statut d'Indien; le droit k
l'autodtermination des autochtones; les effets de l'obligation fiduciaire de la
Couronne concernant les autochtones; et la nature et la port~e des traites de
chasse et de p~che autochtones. L'auteur arrive A la conclusion que ces causes
d6montrent qu'il est n~cessaire pour le syst~me judiciaire d'interpr6ter de
mani~re libdrale les questions relides au droit autochtone mais que la Cour
supreme du Canada ne comprend pas encore ces questions d'une mani~re
approprife tant du point de vue contextuel que culturel.
INTRODUCTION
Aboriginal rights issues enjoy a significant degree of notoriety in contemporary
Canadian jurisprudence. The various issues that aboriginal rights cases have
raised traverse the range of legal matters that have come before Canadian courts.
This situation has not always existed, or at least certainly not in this fashion.
While aboriginal rights issues have been placed before Canadian courts for well
over one hundred years, the frequency with which judges found .themselves
faced with questions of the nature, extent, and effect of aboriginal rights was
much more limited. It was not until the mid-1960s that aboriginal rights issues
truly began to achieve any significant national recognition in the judicial forum.
From that time onward, there was a gradual increase in the number of aboriginal
rights cases brought before Canadian courts.
Although the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the litigation of aboriginal
rights matters, it did not result in the instantaneous creation of the situation that
exists today. Indeed, the present status of aboriginal rights issues in Canadian
law is markedly different than it had been as recently as fifteen years ago. With
* Of the Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. I would like to thank Patrick Bendin for
his helpful comments and suggestions on this paper.
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the promulgation of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and its protection
of existing aboriginal and treaty rights, aboriginal rights issues have become
increasingly more prevalent in Canadian judicial decision making. This phe-
nomenon shows no signs of changing. One needs only look to the wealth of
Supreme Court of Canada judgments released during the past year dealing with
aboriginal rights matters to see the tangible effects of this occurrence.
The Supreme Court of Canada's judgments in the aboriginal rights area over the
past year are only the tip of the iceberg. Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence
has recently been buoyed by a wealth of cases that have provided interesting
insight into judicial understandings of a number of important aboriginal rights
issues. These issues range in focus from the determination of band membership
and Indian status to the incidents of aboriginal rights of self-government, the
effects of the Crown's fiduciary duty to aboriginal peoples, and judicial consid-
erations of the nature and extent of treaty hunting rights and aboriginal fishing
rights. This article will endeavour to provide a review and analysis of some of
the more prominent of these recent judicial determinations that have potentially
significant implications on aboriginal rights issues generally. The cases that will
be reviewed herein include: Sawridge Band v. Canada,1 R. v. Pamajewon,2 R
v. Van der Peet,3 R. v. Badger,4 and Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada
(Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development).5
SAWRIDGE BAND V. CANADA
The central issue in the Sawridge case was the ability of three Alberta Indian
bands, the Sawridge, Ermineskin, and Sarcee bands, to determine the composi-
tion of their band memberships in spite of the 1985 amendments to the federal
Indian Act 6 regarding band membership eligibility under Bill C-31.7 The plain-
1. [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 121 (F.C.T.D.).
2. (22 August 1996) No. 24596 (S.C.C.). This case is now reported as (1996) 199 N.R.
321 (S.C.C.). All references will be to the unreported version of the case.
3. (22 August 1996) No. 23803 (S.C.C.). This case is now reported as (1996) 200 N.R. 1
(S.C.C.). All references will be to the unreported version of the case.
4. (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 324 (S.C.C.).
5. (1995), 130 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.).
6. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
7. An Act to amend the Indian Act, S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4. Bill C-31 provided for the re-
enfranchisement of aboriginal persons who had become disenfranchised through the
provisions of the Indian Act detailing who was and was not entitled to be registered as a
status Indian for the purposes of the Act. For discussion of the effects of Bill C-31, see
Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, The Justice System and Aboriginal People:
Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer,
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tiff bands sought a declaration that sections 8 to 14.3 of the Indian Act be
declared of no force or effect, insofar as they infringed upon or denied the right
of Indian bands to determine their own membership. The plaintiffs claimed that
this right had been exercised from ancient times and was protected by section
35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.8 The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that
the imposition of additional members resulting from the Bill C-31 amendments
offended the bands' rights to freedom of association under section 2(d) of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In its defence, the federal government main-
tained that it possessed the power to regulate band membership under the Indian
Act, which stemmed from the federal government's legislative jurisdiction over
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" under section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.9 It also contended that any rights that the plaintiff bands
may have had regarding control over their membership was extinguished by
federal legislation and Treaties 6, 7, and 8.
The plaintiffs sought to establish that their communities had always determined
their membership on the basis of traditional customs, one of which was that
women followed their men upon marriage. They relied heavily on oral evidence
provided by various band members that, indeed, women followed men upon
marriage with the result that if a woman from one of the plaintiff bands married
a man who was not a member, the woman lost her band membership and became
attached to her husband's band.
At trial, Muldoon J. determined that any rights that the plaintiffs could successfully
establish had to satisty three criteria. Initially, they had to have been asserted prior
to 2 May 1670, the date upon which King Charles II of England granted a royal
charter to the Hudson's Bay Company. Secondly, they must have remained
unextinguished prior to the coming into force of section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982. Finally, those rights must have been able to withstand the application of
section 35(4) of the Act.10 Section 35(4) provides for the equal application of the
rights guaranteed under section 35(1) to male and female persons.
In rejecting the plaintiffs' application, Muldoon J. held that the determination
of band membership rightfully existed with the federal government; moreover,
any rights that Indian bands had had in that regard had long ago been extin-
guished. Following the initial assertion of sovereignty by Britain in 1670,
1991) (Commissioners: A.C. Hamilton and C.M. Sinclair); J. Silman, ed., Enough is
Enough: Aboriginal Women Speak Out, (Toronto: Women's Press, 1987).
8. Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
9. R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5.
10. Supra, note 1 at 147.
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Muldoon J. explained that the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Rupert's Land Act,
186811 "complete[d] the story of the sovereignty claim" to all other lands in
Canada. 12 Insofar as aboriginal rights could be extinguished by the Crown by
"clear and plain" intent prior to the existence of section 35(1), Muldoon J. held
that any rights the plaintiffs may have had regarding their membership were
extinguished by the promulgation of federal Indian legislation before the com-
pletion of Treaties 6, 7, and 8:
The plaintiffs' asserted right to control their own membership of their
"bands" (a wholly statutory term) was emphatically extinguished by the
Indian Act, 1876. Complete control was taken by Parliament in the enact-
ment of that statute and its predecessors. Even if control of hunting and
social groups' or encampments' membership had been a real Aboriginal
right it was extinguished by most clear and unambiguous legislation before
Treaties 6, 7 and 8 ever came into being.13
The treaties themselves, Muldoon J. insisted, further demonstrated that the
plaintiffs had no right to control their membership:
It was quite obvious and well understood by the Indian parties to all three
treaties that the Government of Canada was thereafter to control their band
and reserve membership, because the government was committed to pay
Indians forever as an eternal charge on taxpayers. Clearly the government
was committed also to control who was to be paid individually, and who
was not entitled to be paid individually. The Indians were neither simple-
tons nor crazy. They well understood that "money talks" and that "whoever
pays the piper, calls the tune". 14
Muldoon J. accepted the evidence provided by the Crown's witness, Dr. von
Gernet, as persuasive for the proposition that the plaintiffs' ancestors had no
custom of controlling their groups' or chiefs' peoples' membership. 15 Dr. von
Gernet was found by the court to be a "more impressive witness ... more careful
11. 31-32 Vict., c. 105.
12. Supra, note I at 143.
13. Ibid., at 163-4.
14. Ibid., at 188. See also ibid., at 224, 225:
... Parliament and the Government of Canada purposefully, clearly and plainly
took by statute and by treaty all control of Indian bands' membership including admis-
sion to membership and the veto of applied-for membership. Nothing could be clearer
or plainer.
Parliament has over the years enacted comprehensive statutory, codified provisions
about Indian band membership to the exclusion of all else.
15. Ibid., at 220.
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and organized professional, and the more resilient and reasoned in cross-exam-
ination" 16 than the plaintiffs' witness, Professor Moore, whose report concluded
that the plaintiffs' ancestors had, indeed, definite customs for controlling their
membership. As for the practice of "woman follows man" argued by the
plaintiffs, Muldoon J. held that if that practice had, in fact, existed, it was always
subject to repeal and was repealed by statute. 17 Even if this practice had not
been eliminated, Muldoon J. held that it was entirely inconsistent with section
35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and, therefore, could not exist as a part of
any right to determine membership protected under section 35(1).18 As for the
plaintiffs' freedom of association argument, the trial judge declared that it also
failed for similar reasons:
Fairness is one of the foundations of the Charter and if the plaintiffs invoke
it, they cannot choose only para. 2(d). They must also accept that Bill C-31
finds s.1 justification in ss.15 and especially 28, which carries within the
Charter the very same thrust as does s-s.35(4) outside the Charter.
The Court finds that if there be any infringement of the plaintiffs' freedom
of association under para. 2(d) in Bill C-31, it is quite justified on the
grounds of equality in s.15; and the assertion that the Charter's rights and
freedoms are guaranteed equally to male and female persons, in s.28. 19
In arriving at his conclusions, Muldoon J. made a number of obiter comments
on other issues which derogate from the objectivity and authority of his
judgment. Statements made in the course of his judgment about the origins
of the Mdtis people,20 the honour of the Crown, 21 the reliability of oral
16. Ibid., at 211.
17. Ibid., at 191.
18. See ibid., at 221:
... [here was and is no Aboriginal right to control membership which
engages s-s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. If there were, of course, it
would be subject to s-s.35(4) and would be of no force and effect to the extent it
failed (as it did, if it existed) to guarantee membership and marital status equally
to male and female persons.
19. Ibid., at 227, 228.
20. Ibid., at 147:
It must be left to others at another time to explain how the revisionists who
settled upon s-s.35(2) thought that they could honestly characterize Mdtis people
as Aboriginal people, wielding Aboriginal rights.... Only some determined
revisionist would seek to regard Mtis as being exemplars of only one of their
inherently dual lines of ancestors. It will be seen, however, that conduct and
lifestyle will be noted in terms of "half-breeds living the 'Indian way of Life'," in
this dismally racist subject of litigation.
21. Ibid., at 174: 'The so-called "honour of the Crown" is surely nothing more than a trans-
parent semantic membrane for wrapping together Indian reserve apartheid and perpet-
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evidence,22 and the use of "blood quantum" provisions in band membership
codes 23 reveal a profound lack of discretion on his part. Moreover, they are
ual dependence on Canadian taxpayers.'
22. Ibid., at 195, 196:
... [Wlithout any means of keeping a written record the probabilities lead to the
conclusion that myth or oral history would not yield any objectively reliable reason
or knowledge ... That surely is the trouble with oral history. It just does not
lie easily in the mouth of the folk who transmit oral history to relate that their
ancestors were ever venal, criminal, cruel, mean-spirited, unjust, cowardly,
perfidious, bigoted or indeed, aught but noble, brave, fair and generous, etc. etc.
In no time at all historical stories, if ever accurate, soon become mortally skewed
propaganda, without objective verity.... So ancestor advocacy or ancestor worship
is one of the most counter-productive, racist, hateful and backward-looking of
all human characteristics, or religion, or what passes for thought.... So saying,
the Court is most emphatically not mocking or belittling those who assert
that, because their ancestors never developed writing, oral history is their only
means of keeping their history alive. It would always be best to put the stories
into writing at the earliest possible time in order to avoid some of the embellish-
ments which render oral history so unreliable. [Emphasis added]
In contrast to what Muldoon J. characterises as the inherent unreliability of oral history,
see J. Borrows, "With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)," (1996), 41
McGill L.J. 629, at 648:
First Nations stories ... can also be distinguished from Common law precedents
in both form and content because of the way they are recorded and applied.
First Nations use an oral tradition to chronicle important information. ... As such,
the application of these memories and words is quite different from the application
of Common law precedent. Non-ceremonial stories can change from one telling
to another, but such changes do not mean that the story's truth is lost; rather,
modification recognizes that context is always changing, requiring a constant
reinterpretation of many of the account's elements. First Nations stories take
this form because there is an attempt to convey contextual meaning relevant to
the times and needs of the listeners.
See also G. Valencia-Weber, "Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law," (1994), 24
N.M. L. Rev. 227, at 229:
In the tribal society, past and present are inseparable as the continuation of a
story anchored in values enduring in contemporary life ... In the creation of
American Indian common law, in the longstanding and emerging tribal courts,
custom serves in conjunction with appropriate principles from federal and state
law.
23. Ibid., at 225: ' "Blood quantum" is a highly fascist and racist notion, and puts its practi-
tioners on the path of the Nazi Party led by the late, most unlamented Adolf Hitler.'
Interestingly, Muldoon J. uses blood quantum in rejecting the claim that the Metis are
aboriginal peoples under section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982. See note 20,
supra.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
entirely unnecessary to the decision.24 Yet, even in the absence of the unfortun-
ate, and unnecessary, obiter comments made by Muldoon J. in the course of his
judgment in Sawridge, his decision provides ample fodder for further discussion
and analysis.
The Sawridge case is significant for its discussion of Bill C-31 and that
document's effects on those persons reinstated by it as well as the bands to which
they belong. The Sawridge case may be viewed as an indication that in righting
an historical wrong via Bill C-31, Parliament has created a new series of
problems which could end up being resolved in the courts. The introduction of
section 35(4) arguments in the case is significant as well, since section 35(4)
has been discussed in few cases since it was added to section 35 by the
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983.25 In Sawridge, Muldoon J. treats
it as a substantive part of the rights guaranteed by section 35(1). He equates the
effect of section 35(4) on the constitutional guarantee of aboriginal and treaty
rights with that of sections 15 and 28 of the Charter on Charter rights. While,
technically, section 35(4) exists only as an interpretive aid to section 35(1), its
effect upon section 35(1) rights is profound; it serves as a constitutional
guarantee of equality of aboriginal and treaty rights between male and female
aboriginal persons.
Muldoon J.'s treatment of other issues in Sawridge is, however, not quite as
progressive as his analysis of the effect of section 35(4). His judgment adheres
strictly to the notion that the British Crown's claims to sovereignty over Canada
ought to be considered an absolute historical fact. In his appraisal, Muldoon J.
views the rise of European power in North America as the result of "historical
and economic processes which were unavoidable. '26 Indeed, he states that
"[t]he only question was whether the dominant Europeans would be the French,
the British or the Spanish ...-27 His characterisation of the process of European
colonisation in North America is a drastic oversimplification of a series of events
and occurrences that transpired over the course of centuries. Rather than being
an historical inevitability, the process whereby Britain gained its position of
power in North America resulted from the stringing together of factors such as
24. Note the commentary by T. Isaac in "Self-Government, Indian Women and Their
Rights of Reinstatement Under the Indian Act. A Comment on Sawridge Band v. Can-
ada," [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 1, at 7: "... [Muldoon J.'s] critique of the existing law, namely
section 35(2) which includes Mftis peoples, is out of place in a judicial decision and
raises the question of what is, and what is not, appropriate for judges to comment on."
25. SI/84-102.
26. Supra, note 1 at 151.
27. Ibid.
Aboriginal Rights Law, Year in Review
the effects of disease, warfare, and aboriginal reliance on European manufac-
tured goods that could not have been contemplated by the Europeans or the
aboriginals. Furthermore, Muldoon J.'s determination that Britain had to have
already asserted sovereignty in order to grant the Hudson's Bay Charter in 1670
flies in the face of the historical record, which demonstrates that the papal bulls
and royal charters dating from the fifteenth century 28 that purported to grant
authority to particular nations or individuals to take control of North American
lands were continuously ignored by rival European nations when it was in their
interests to do so. As Slattery has argued:
Any balanced survey of European state practice reveals that although most
imperial powers indulged on occasion in lofty claims based on discovery,
symbolic acts, and occupation, these same powers often poured scorn on
such claims when advanced by their European rivals. In short, they were
not prepared to grant others the benefit of principles claimed on their own
behalf. So, it may be doubted whether the supposed rules achieved true
reciprocal acceptance, even among the nations that stood to benefit from
them.29
The Sawridge decision is also demonstrative of the Canadian judiciary's often-
restrictive interpretation of treaties between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.
Muldoon J. states that "[tihere is no doubt that, in entering into the treaties [the
aboriginal peoples] sought the protection of - and perhaps ill-advisedly - the
dependence on, the Crown ..."30 Such an interpretation fails to account for
aboriginal understandings of the purpose of treaties, which view them as lasting
compacts of peace and friendship that recognised and respected the indepen-
dence and autonomy of the European and aboriginal nations that were parties
to them.3 1 This understanding, furthermore, was shared in by Britain from the
28. See, for example, the papal bull Romanus Pontifex, issued by Pope Nicholas V in 1455,
as reproduced in F.G. Davenport, European Treaties bearing on the History of the
United States and its Dependencies to 1648, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution,
1917), at 20; see also the Letters Patent toJohn Cabot, 5 March 1496, as reproduced in
H. S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 8th ed., (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1968), at 5.
29. B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims," (1991), 29 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 681, at 688-9.
30. Supra, note I at 154.
31. See, for example, Grand Chief D. Marshall Sr., Grand Captain A. Denny, Putus S. Mar-
shall, of the Executive of the Grand Council of the Mi'kmaw Nation, "The Covenant
Chain," in B. Richardson, ed., Drumbeat. Anger and Renewal in Indian Country,
(Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1993), at 75:
Treaties are spiritual as well as political compacts that confer solemn and
binding obligations on the signatories. The spiritual basis of the treaties is crucial
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time of initial contact between the groups until shortly after the cession of her
hostilities with the United States through the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 and the
Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817.32 This shared understanding of treaties as
solemn and binding commitments between independent nations that are of a
lasting quality is evidenced in the existence of the Covenant Chain alliance, a
military, political, social, and economic alliance initially between the Dutch and
River Indians of the Hudson River region, but later forged between Britain and
Iroquois Confederacy and then expanded to encompass a host of other aboriginal
nations.33
The Covenant Chain alliance is a prime example of Crown-Native treaties as
solemn, binding, and continuous agreements that were understood and expected
to be faithfully observed by all parties. 34 The mutuality and solemnity of the
to an understanding of their meaning, since it represents an effort to elevate the
treaties, and relations among peoples, beyond the vagaries of political
opportunism and expediency. They are intended to develop through time
to keep pace with events, while still preserving the original intentions and
rights of the parties.
See also D. Opekokew and A. Pratt, '"he Treaty Right to Education in Saskatchewan,"
(1992), 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3, at 8: "Generally, when the First Nations refer
to treaty rights, they do not distinguish between the political and legal content of those
rights. They have historically considered the treaties to be ... political and legal agree-
ments between sovereign government orders." See also Hon. A.C. Hamilton, A New
Partnership, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada,
1995), at 6: "For Aboriginal people, the historical significance and their understanding
of treaties and of treaty making is that they represent an on-going relationship between
two or more peoples bound by honour and trust."
32. As historian J.R. Miller has commented in Sweet Promises: A Reader in Indian-White
Relations in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), at xi:
The Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817, the real end of the War of 1812, demilitarized
the Great Lakes and ushered in enduring peace between the United States and British
North America (BNA), and the Indians were no longer needed as allies and military
partners. The consequence was what one historian has referred to as the 'onset
of irrelevance' of the Indians to Euro-Canadians.
See also the discussion in L.I. Rotman, Solemn Commitments: Fiduciary Obligations,
Treaty Relationships and the Foundational Principles of Crown-Native Relations in
Canada, unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1996, especially in
Chapters VI and VII.
33. The Treaty of Albany and the Covenant Chain alliance are discussed in greater detail in
L.I. Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in
Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
34. See P.C. Williams, The Chain, unpublished LL.M. thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School,
1982, at 59:
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Covenant Chain alliance is represented in the following exchange of promises
between Sir William Johnson and the Six Nations on 20 February 1756:
Brethren
This animates me with fresh pleasure and affection, and at this import-
ant conjuncture of affairs to brighten and strengthen the Covenant Chain,
that has so long linked us together in mutual friendship and brother[ly]
affection which I hope will continue inviolable and sacred, as long as the
Sun shines or the Rivers continue to water the earth, notwithstanding all the
intrigues of our old and perfidious enemys, who have left no means
unessayed, and especially at this time to weaken and divide us that so they
may in the event root our the remembrance of your name, and Nations from
the face of the earth.
A large Covenant Belt.
Brother Warraghiyagey
We have now opened our minds with Freedom & sincerity and we
understand each other clearly let us mutually remember our engagements
which we have again so solemnly renewed and if at any time our enemy
should attack us, prove by your readiness to support & assist us, that you
really love us, and we assure you we shall not be wanting on our parts to
give proofs of the like fidelity, & friendship.
A Belt. 35
The Covenant Chain alliance demonstrates the reciprocity with which treaties
were concluded. Treaties emerged as the result of negotiations between the
parties, not out of unilateral action, paternalism, or the gratuitous benevolence
of either side:
... mhe aboriginal parties to treaties were considered to be distinct, self-
governing nations, capable of making collective decisions, of establishing
co-equal relationships ("alliances") and of controlling their own affairs.
The most constant relationship, and the one that had the longest and widest
effect, is that of the Covenant Chain of silver, binding the British colonies
and the Indian nations together in friendship, peace and mutual assistance. It
stretches from the east coast of North America to the west of Lake Superior, and
from the coasts of James Bay to the Florida borders. The Chain, like the road,
the pipe and the wall, is an enduring symbol of international relations in North
America.
35. As reproduced in E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of
the State of New York, 11 vols., (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1853-1861), VII, at 59, 62.
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
They had the capacity to negotiate with the Crown, and to voluntarily agree
or withhold consent. The Crown approached the aboriginal societies on the
basis that problems were to be solved through co-operation, negotiation and
quid pro quo bargaining, rather than unilateral imposition.36
By taking treaties out of the contexts in which they arose - 'the Indians ...
wanted the dependent status into which they bargained themselves, seemingly
"forever"' 37 - and reducing them to simple financial exchanges whereby the
aboriginal peoples were to be held subject to the oversimplified dictates of a
marketplace in which "'money talks" and "whoever pays the piper, calls the
tune,"' 38 Muldoon J. provides a drastic and ahistorical mischaracterisation and
misrepresentation of the basis of the treaties which fails to account for the
history of Crown-aboriginal relations generally, and Crown-aboriginal treaty
relations specifically.
The Sawridge case is a controversial one. Underlying the application by the
plaintiffs is the question of whether aboriginal bands are obliged to share their
resources with persons who have been reinstated by the Bill C-31 amendments
to the Indian Act. Therefore, while the case is, essentially, one of self-govern-
ment or self-determination, there is a considerable human element to the issues
that goes beyond the matter of whether aboriginal bands have the authority to
determine the composition of their membership. Should the bands be required
to admit those persons reinstated by Bill C-3 1, that could disrupt the status quo
on those reserves, in particular the administrative and financial structures that
currently exist, through the expansion of band membership bases. If bands are
found to have the power to determine membership, what then happens to those
persons entitled to be registered under Bill C-31 who are denied membership?
Band administrations across Canada will be watching the appeal of the Sawridge
case with interest, as will those persons reinstated by Bill C-3 1. It remains to be
seen whether the Federal Court of Appeal will attempt to contextualise its
judgment by explicitly incorporating these related issues or whether they will
remain on the periphery, as they did in the Sawridge case.
36. B.H. Wildsmith, "Treaty Responsibilities: A Co-Relational Model," (1992), U.B.C. L.
Rev. Special Edition on Aboriginal Justice 324, at 331. See also Wildsmith, ibid., at
330; M. Jackson, "The Articulation of Native Rights in Canadian Law," (1984), 18
U.B.C. L. Rev. 255, at 257: "It was through the process of consensual treaty-making, in
which Indian tribes were recognized as independent nations, that the terms of European
settlement and the tribes' continued occupation of their hunting territories were mutu-
ally agreed."
37. Supra, note 1 at 156.
38. Ibid., at 188.
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R. V. PAMAJEWON
Like the Sawridge case, Pamajewon was concerned with issues of aboriginal
self-government and its associated powers. Rather than dealing with the issue
of control over band membership, however, the Pamajewon case dealt with the
ability of aboriginal groups to engage in and regulate gambling activities on
reserves pursuant to and as an exercise of, their powers of self-government.
Howard Pamajewon and Roger Jones, members of the Shawanaga First Nation,
were charged with keeping a common gaming house contrary to section 201(1)
of the Criminal Code.39 They had been operating a high stakes bingo and other
gambling activities on the band's reserve pursuant to the authority of the
Shawanaga First Nation lottery law. That law was enacted by the band council
in August 1987, but was not a by-law passed pursuant to section 81 of the Indian
Act. The Shawanaga First Nation did not possess a provincial licence authorising
the gambling activities occurring on the reserve. Furthermore, it had refused the
Ontario Lottery Corporation's offer of a gambling licence on the basis that since
it possessed an inherent right of self-government, obtaining such a licence was
unnecessary.
Criminal charges had also been laid against Arnold Gardner, Jack Pitchenese,
and Allan Gardner, members of the Eagle Lake First Nation, under section
206(1)(d) of the Criminal Code for conducting a scheme for the purpose of
determining the winners of property. The Eagle Lake First Nation had been
operating a bingo on its reserve and had been approached by the Ontario
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations about negotiating with the
Ontario Lottery Commission for a provincial licence authorising its bingo. It
did not negotiate for such a licence because it asserted that it had a right to be
self-regulating in its economic activities.
The five accused were all convicted at trial and their convictions upheld on
appeal. The issue brought before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the
ability to hold and regulate high stakes gambling by the Shawanaga and Eagle
Lake First Nations fell within the scope of their aboriginal rights protected by
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, in particular their right to self-gov-
ernment.
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal from the bench, with
reasons to be provided later. In his judgment, Lamer C.J.C. held that the
appellants had no constitutionally-protected right under section 35(1) to conduct
the activities that gave rise to the criminal charges that were laid. As Lamer
39. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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C.J.C. explained, while the evidence led at the Pamajewon and Gardner trials
demonstrated that the Ojibwa people did gamble informally and on a small-
scale, it did not demonstrate that gambling or the regulation of gambling on the
scale that took place was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of either the
Shawanaga or Eagle Lake First Nations. 40 The Chief Justice held that to
characterise the appellants' activities as falling under a broad right to manage
the use of their reserve lands "would be to cast the Court's inquiry at a level of
excessive generality."41
L'Heureux-Dube J. agreed with the disposition of the case by Lamer C.J.C., but
arrived at her conclusion by a different route. She concurred with the Chief
Justice that the appellants' claim of authority to make decisions regarding the
social, economic, and cultural well-being of their people was overly broad.
However, she held that the right claimed by the appellants should not be
characterised as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities on
their reserves, as suggested by Lamer C.J.C. Instead, she maintained that the
scope of the rights asserted should be assessed by inquiring as to whether the
appellants possessed an aboriginal right to gamble.42 In accordance with the
evidence presented at trial, L'Heureux-Dube J. concluded that the appellants did
not possess an aboriginal right to gamble that was capable of protection by
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Consequently, she found it unnec-
essary to consider the question of the appellants' right to self-government. 43
The Pamajewon case has been criticised in various circles as an inappropriate
vehicle upon which to assert the existence of aboriginal rights to self-govern-
ment under section 35(1). Conversely, it has also been held up as an illustration
that the aboriginal right to self-government involves the ability of First Nations
to determine for themselves what is in their best interests and how they will
conduct their activities. Thus, under this latter argument, if the Shawanaga and
Eagle Lake First Nations determined that gambling on their reserves was in the
best interests of those groups, they should be entitled to engage in such activity
without having to seek authorisation from non-aboriginal governmental author-
ities.
In assessing the situation at hand, the Supreme Court focused on the more
limited question of whether the gambling activities in question constituted rights
40. Supra, note 2, at para. 28.
41. Ibid., at para. 27.
42. Ibid., at para. 37.
43. Ibid., at para. 40.
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protected by section 35(1) rather than whether the First Nations in question
possessed rights of self-government existing under the auspices of section
35(1).44 Consequently, the scope of their inquiry was far more restricted than it
would have been if the latter question was being considered. The Pamajewon
decision thus did not provide any additional insight into the issues surrounding
aboriginal self-government.
Aboriginal self-government is an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of
issues which vary from First Nation to First Nation. What may be described as
self-government powers in one situation may not be appropriate in another. It
is also a politically-charged term. For these reasons, it is not easily dealt with,
either in the courts or in other arenas. By finding that the bands in the Pamajewon
case did not possess aboriginal rights to gamble or maintain gambling activities
on their reserves, the Supreme Court was able to circumvent the issue of
aboriginal self-government, thereby leaving it for another day. The basis of the
Supreme Court's appraisal of the rights asserted in Pamajewon may be traced
directly to that court's simultaneously-released decision in R. v. Van der Peet,45
an aboriginal fishing rights case, in which standards for the analysis of aborig-
inal rights were put forward by Lamer C.J.C., L'Heureux-Dube J., and
McLachlin J. in their respective judgments in the case.
R. v. VAN DER PEET
In Van der Peet, the appellant, Mrs. Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo nation,
was charged under section 27(5) of the British Columbia Fishery (General)
Regulations6 with selling ten salmon for $50 while fishing under the authority
of an Indian food fishing licence. Section 27(5) prohibited the sale or barter of
fish caught under such a licence. The appellant contested the charges, arguing
that she had an aboriginal right to sell the fish that was protected by section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
44. Indeed, the question stated for the court, as reproduced at para. 20 of the judgment, read
as follows:
Are s. 201, s. 206 or s. 207 of the Criminal Code, separately or in combination,
of no force or effect with respect to the appellants, by virtue of s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 in the circumstances of these proceedings, by reason
of the aboriginal or treaty rights within the meaning of s. 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 invoked by the appellants?
45. Supra, note 3.
46. Issued pursuant to the federal Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
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At trial, it was declared that aboriginal rights to fish for food and ceremonial
purposes did not include the right to sell fish and the appellant was found guilty.
The summary appeal judge found that an aboriginal right to sell fish did exist
and remanded the appellant for a new trial. Upon further appeal to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, a majority judgment restored the guilty verdict
imposed at trial. When the Van der Peet case and two other fishing rights cases,
R. v. Gladstone47 and R. v. N.TC. Smokehouse,48 were heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada, they were viewed as the conclusion of that court's analysis of
aboriginal fishing rights that had been initiated some six years previously in the
case of R. v. Sparrow.49 As Lamer C.J.C. explained:
This appeal, along with the companion appeals in R. v. N. T C. Smokehouse
and R. v. Gladstone, raises the issue left unresolved by this court in its judg-
ment in R. v. Sparrow: how are the aboriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to be defined?50
The Van der Peet case differed from Sparrow in one major respect, though; while
the Sparrow case focused on the ability of an aboriginal person to fish for food,
a fact that was not in dispute in that case, Van der Peet centred on the ability of
an aboriginal person authorised to fish for food to sell or barter that fish without
a licence to do so.
Lamer C.J.C.'s majority decision, concurred in by La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier,
Cory, Iacobucci, and Major JJ., held that while Mrs. Van der Peet had an
aboriginal right to catch fish, she did not have an aboriginal right to sell or barter
fish. However, in assessing the appellant's actions and whether they were
consistent with the exercise of her aboriginal rights under section 35(1), Lamer
C.J.C. held that it was first necessary to articulate the purposes underpinning
section 35(1). In particular, he attempted to explain the rationale behind section
35(1)'s recognition and affirmation of the unique constitutional status of aborig-
inal peoples in Canada. Without first understanding why aboriginal rights exist
and why they receive constitutional protection, Lamer C.J.C. declared that it
was impossible to provide an adequate definition of those rights.51
47. (21 August 1996) No. 23801 (S.C.C.). This case is now reported as (1996) 200 N.R.
189 (S.C.C.). All references will be to the unreported version of the case.
48. (21 August 1996) No. 23800 (S.C.C.). This case is now reported as (1996) 200 N.R.
321 (S.C.C.). All references will be to the unreported version of the case.
49. (1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
50. Supra, note 3 at para. 1.
51. Ibid., at para. 3.
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Lamer C.J.C. determined that a purposive approach to section 35(1) was needed
so that the interests that that section was intended to protect - what he described
as the dual nature of aboriginal rights, or the "aboriginal and the rights in
aboriginal rights" - could be identified. 52 He held that adopting a purposive
approach, a suggestion made by the Supreme Court in Sparrow, would ensure
that what was encompassed within the term "aboriginal rights" would be related
to the intended focus of section 35(1), specifically aboriginal people and their
rights in relation to Canadian society as a whole. 53 This purposive approach was
to take place in accordance with giving section 35(1) a generous and liberal
interpretation in favour of aboriginal peoples, a notion also suggested in Spar-
row. As Lamer C.J.C. explained, this interpretive principle stemmed from the
fiduciary nature of the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples
and must inform the court's analysis of the purposes underlying section 35(1),
as well as that section's definition and scope.54
In his examination of aboriginal rights, Lamer C.J.C. affirmed the principle
established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. Attorney General of
British Columbia55 and subsequently upheld in Guerin v. R. 56 and Sparrow, that
aboriginal rights were not created by section 35(1), but were only recognised
and affirmed by it. This fact indicated to Lamer C.J.C. that the doctrine of
aboriginal rights exists because of the fact that aboriginal peoples lived in North
America prior to the first arrival of Europeans to her shores. On this basis, he
determined that section 35(1) functions as a constitutional framework through
which "the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with
their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with
the sovereignty of the Crown."'57
In order to ascertain the scope of the aboriginal rights existing under section
35(1), Lamer C.J.C. developed a test for identifying those rights. That test,
aimed at "identifying the crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive
societies," focused on those practices, traditions, and customs that were central
to aboriginal societies prior to contact with Europeans. 58 Practices that arose in
52. Ibid., at para. 20-1.
53. Ibid., at para. 21.
54. Ibid., at para. 24.
55. (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.).
56. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
57. Supra, note 3 at para. 31.
58. Ibid., at para. 44.
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response to the European presence in North America were deemed not to qualify
as aboriginal rights. 59 While Lamer C.J.C. restricted the definition of aboriginal
rights to pre-contact practices, he did not find that it was necessary for an
applicant to demonstrate conclusive evidence of a right's existence dating from
pre-contact times. Rather, post-contact evidence of particular practices could be
used as long as it demonstrated a link with practices existing prior to contact:
Where an aboriginal community can demonstrate that a particular practice,
custom or tradition is integral to its distinctive culture today, and that this
practice, custom or tradition has continuity with the practices, customs and
traditions of pre-contact times, that community will have demonstrated that
the practice, custom or tradition is an aboriginal right for the purposes of s.
35(1).60
Lamer C.J.C. held that requiring aboriginal peoples to provide conclusive,
pre-contact evidence to demonstrate the existence of an aboriginal right con-
tradicted the spirit and intent of section 35(1). He explained that such a
requirement defined aboriginal rights so rigidly that successful claims of their
existence would be precluded.61 As a result, he declared that a court faced with
a claim of an aboriginal right should approach the rules of evidence "with a
consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary
difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were no
written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in."' 62 With this
understanding in mind, he maintained that courts must not undervalue the
evidence led by an aboriginal applicant "simply because that evidence does not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for
example, a private law torts case."' 63
Finally, to establish that an activity was an aboriginal right, Lamer C.J.C.
determined that an applicant had to demonstrate that that activity was an element
of a practice, tradition, or custom integral to the distinctive culture of the
aboriginal group claiming the right, as had been put forward by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Sparrow.64 In assessing the applicant's claim, he held that
59. Ibid., at para. 73: "... [W]here the practice, custom or tradition arose solely as a
response to European influences then that practice, custom or tradition will not meet the
standard for recognition of an aboriginal right."
60. Ibid., at para. 63.
61. Ibid., at para. 62.
62. Ibid., at para. 68.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., at para. 46.
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a court must account for the perspective of the aboriginal peoples claiming the
right; however, that perspective must be "framed in terms cognizable to the
Canadian legal and constitutional structure."'65 Lamer C.J.C. further stated that
even where aboriginal practices have evolved into modem forms, that evolution
would not preclude a finding of a continuity with pre-contact practices as long
as that continuity was demonstrated. 66
Lamer C.J.C. held that the majority decision in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal's determination of the Van der Peet case had wrongfully characterised
the appellant's claim as a commercial right to fish, rather than a right to sell fish.
Meanwhile, he determined that the "social test" adopted by Lambert J.A. in
dissent - which focused on the significance of the practices, traditions, or
customs to the aboriginal culture in question for the identification of aboriginal
rights - took into account too broad a spectrum of factors that "distracted" the
court from what its true focus ought to be, namely "the nature of the aboriginal
community's traditions, customs or practices themselves. '67 While Lamer
C.J.C. agreed that the significance of the practice, tradition, or custom to the
aboriginal community is a factor for determining whether that activity was
"integral to the distinctive culture," he held that "the significance of a practice,
tradition or custom cannot, itself, constitute an aboriginal right.' 68 Instead, he
insisted that:
To characterize an applicant's claim correctly, a court should consider such
factors as the nature of the action which the applicant is claiming was done
pursuant to an aboriginal right, the nature of the governmental regulation,
statute or action being impugned, and the tradition, custom or practice
being relied upon to establish the right.69
In the matter before the Supreme Court, Lamer C.J.C.'s directive entailed that
the court should consider the actions leading up to the appellant being charged,
the fishery regulation under which she was charged, and the practices, traditions,
and customs that she invoked to support her claim to an aboriginal right to
engage in the activities that led to her being charged. He maintained that her
activities must be considered at a general rather than specific level. For a
practice, tradition, or custom to be described as an aboriginal right, it had to be
65. Ibid., at para. 49.
66. Supra, note 60.
67. Ibid., at para. 52.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., at para. 53.
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demonstrated to be a "central and significant part of the society's distinctive
culture." 70 Despite his remonstrations against post-contact practices constitut-
ing aboriginal rights, Lamer C.J.C. held that a modernised form of a pre-contact
practice, tradition, or custom could still constitute an aboriginal right. 71
Lamer C.J.C. found that the trial judge in Van der Peet had correctly stated that
while the Sto:lo did fish for food and ceremonial purposes as an integral part of
their distinctive culture prior to contact, their sale or bartering of salmon at that
time was "minimal, and opportunistic. '72 The trial judge had concluded that the
market and trade in salmon did not truly exist until after contact and the
establishment of the Hudson's Bay Company's fort at Langley.73 Consequently,
Lamer C.J.C. agreed with the trial judge that the exchange of salmon for money
or other goods by the Sto:lo people did not form an integral part of their
distinctive culture prior to contact and was not a "significant, integral or defining
feature of that society."'74
Evidence presented at trial by the appellant linking the exchange of salmon to
the maintenance of kinship and family relations was held not to support the claim
to an aboriginal right to sell or barter fish.75 The absence of regularised trading
systems among the Sto:lo was also held to indicate the lack of centralness of the
salmon trade to Sto:lo culture.76 Finally, Lamer C.J.C. agreed with the trial
judge's finding that the salmon trade between the Sto:lo and the Hudson's Bay
Company was qualitatively different than what was typical of Sto:lo culture
prior to contact and, therefore, could not constitute an aboriginal right.77 He held
that the Sto:lo's trade with the Hudson's Bay Company did not have the requisite
continuity with pre-contact Sto:lo practices to enable it to be characterised as
an aboriginal right; instead, the centralness, or significance, of trade with the
Hudson's Bay Company arose entirely in response to European influences. 78
For these reasons, Lamer C.J.C. concluded that the appeal must fail.
70. Ibid., at para. 55.
71. Ibid., at para. 54.
72. Ibid., at para. 84.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., at para. 85.
75. Ibid., at para. 87.
76. Ibid., at para. 89.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
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The standard for the determination of aboriginal rights established by Lamer
C.J.C. in Van der Peet elaborates somewhat on the "integral to the distinctive
culture" test set out in Sparrow. It does not require that a practice, tradition, or
custom be distinct, or unique, to the aboriginal culture in question, only that it
be distinctive.79 In other words, the practice need not be unique to a culture, but
help make the culture what it is. 80 Consequently, those practices that were aspects
of an aboriginal society that are true of every human society, such as "eating to
survive," or merely incidental or occasional to an aboriginal society, were not
capable of being described as aboriginal rights. 81 In determining which practices
were integral to the aboriginal culture in question, Lamer C.J.C. advocated the use
of Lambert J.A.'s "social test" whose use he had rejected in determining whether
an aboriginal practice, tradition, or custom constituted an aboriginal right.
Despite the positive aspects of Lamer C.J.C.'s judgment in Van der Peet - he
adopts the purposive determination of aboriginal rights suggested by Sparrow,
distinguishes between aboriginal rights and rights originating at common law,
and is sensitive to the problems aboriginal peoples face in adducing evidence in
support of their aboriginal rights claims - he contradicts precedents established
in a number of Supreme Court of Canada decisions which he cites in support of
his judgment. His finding that aboriginal rights must be rooted in pre-contact
practices adopts the "frozen rights" theory of aboriginal rights that was rejected
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Sparrow case and which Lamer C.J.C.
himself argues against adopting in Van der Peet. While he determined that
pre-contact aboriginal rights may be exercised in a modem form and still be
recognised as aboriginal rights, arbitrarily limiting the definition of aboriginal
rights to pre-contact practices embraces frozen rights theory by prohibiting the
creation of new aboriginal rights arising from the necessity to maintain the
viability of distinctive aboriginal cultures in the face of European interference
with traditional aboriginal ways of life. It is circular reasoning to suggest, on
one hand, that aboriginal rights must encompass only those practices that are
79. Ibid., at para. 71.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., at para. 56. See also ibid, at para. 70:
Where two customs exist, but one is merely incidental to the other, the custom
which is integral to the aboriginal community in question will qualify as an
aboriginal right, but the custom that is merely incidental will not. Incidental
practices, customs and traditions cannot qualify as aboriginal rights through a
process of piggybacking on integral practices, customs and traditions.
See the further discussion of Lamer C.J.C.'s rejection of incidental rights, infra.
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integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies and then, when the
presence of European settlement interferes with or renders those practices
ineffective, prevent the recognition of new practices that arose in response to
that European interference from being recognised as aboriginal rights.
It is suggested that, in spite of Lamer C.J.C.'s conclusions, judicial emphasis
upon temporal considerations as the sole determinants of the nature of aboriginal
and treaty rights are misguided. Time-based methods of inquiry are entirely
incapable of recognising rights that are no less important than long-practiced
rights, but which are of newer genesis. As Slattery has suggested, the notion of
existing rights "suggests that the rights in question are affirmed in a contempo-
rary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour". 82 This statement
was approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow.83 Both aboriginal
and treaty rights are dynamic, evolving rights. Consequently, they ought not be
restricted to their "primeval simplicity and vigour," but, rather, must be allowed
to adapt to changing circumstances. If, as in Van der Peet, the fact of European
settlement created the cultural and physical need for the Sto:lo people to engage
in the sale or barter of fish, then that activity ought to be regarded as a protected
aboriginal right regardless of whether it was induced and driven by European
influences.
Other than stating that aboriginal practices arising after contact cannot be
characterised as aboriginal rights, Lamer C.J.C. does not attempt to justify why
it is that aboriginal rights cannot arise in response to European influences. Was
he suggesting that aboriginal peoples who adopt European practices and habits
cease to be aboriginal? As anthropologist Robin Ridington has explained,
"aboriginal cultures do not disappear when they come into contact with modem
technology. Aboriginal people do not cease to be aboriginal by eating pizza, or
... by driving motor vehicles, teaching school, or working at skilled wage
labour.' ' 84 Meanwhile, there is nothing in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 that supports the proposition that aboriginal rights must be rooted solely
in pre-contact practices.
In addition to contradicting the rejection of frozen rights theory in Sparrow,
Lamer C.J.C.'s rejection of constitutional protection for incidental practices that
82. B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, at 782.
83. Supra, note 49 at 397: 'Clearly, then, an approach to the constitutional guarantee
embodied in s. 35(1) which would incorporate "frozen rights" must be rejected.'
84. R. Ridington, "Fieldwork in Courtroom 53: A Witness to Delgamnuukw," in F. Cassidy,
ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen, (Lantzville:
Oolichan Books, 1992), at 211.
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"piggyback" on aboriginal rights appears to goes against the thrust of the
Supreme Court of Canada's unanimous judgment in Simon v. R. 85 In that case,
the court held that the right of an aboriginal person exercising a treaty right to
hunt included the ability to engage in "those activities reasonably incidental to
the act of hunting itself, an example of which is travelling with the requisite
hunting equipment to the hunting grounds. ' 86 Meanwhile, in Saanichton
Marina Ltd. v. Claxton, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the
Tsawout band's 1852 treaty right to "carry on our fisheries as formerly,"
included the protection of the place where the band exercised that right. This
entitled the band to receive a permanent injunction to prohibit a proposed marina
from further development, since the marina would disrupt the band's fishery
protected under treaty. As the court explained:
Construction of the marina will derogate from the right of the Indians to
carry on their fisheries as formerly in the area of Saanichton Bay protected
by the treaty. To begin with it will limit and impede their right of access to
an important area of the bay. Further they will not be able to carry on the
important stationary crab fishery as formerly.... The development, while
only a small area of the bay, will have a harmful impact on the right of fish-
ery granted to the Indians by treaty.8 7
While these "reasonably incidental" rights are not dealt with in the treaties in
Simon and Saanichton Marina respectively, they are integral to the exercise of
the rights that are protected under the treaties considered therein. A strict
interpretation of the treaties, or of aboriginal rights generally, would ostensibly
preclude reasonably incidental rights from receiving protection. However, the
flexible interpretation of aboriginal treaties articulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in cases such as Simon, or, for that matter, the generous and liberal
interpretation of aboriginal rights argued for by Lamer C.J.C. in Van der Peet,
requires that they be protected because they are vital to the exercise of the rights
that are explicitly protected. Where seemingly-extraneous matters are vital to
the adequate exercise of aboriginal or treaty rights, they must be included as
parts of those rights. These sentiments would appear to accord with Lamer
C.J.C.'s professed adherence to giving section 35(1) a generous and liberal
interpretation in favour of aboriginal peoples; nevertheless, he manages to
depart from them without recognising this element of self-contradiction in his
judgment.
85. (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 390 (S.C.C.).
86. Ibid., at 403.
87. (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 79 (C.A.), at 92.
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In addition to Lamer C.J.C.'s majority judgment, there were two dissenting
judgments rendered in Van der Peer. L'Heureux-Dube J. advocated defining the
nature and extent of aboriginal rights in the "broader context of the historical
aboriginal reality in Canada."'88 One aspect of this broader reality, she explained,
was the recognition that aboriginal rights must be construed in light of the
special fiduciary relationship that exists between the Crown and aboriginal
peoples in Canada.89 In defining aboriginal rights in this fashion, L'Heureux-
Dube J. departed from the Chief Justice's focus on specific aboriginal practices,
traditions, and customs, which she held looked only at discrete parts of aborig-
inal culture in a manner separate and apart from the general culture of the
peoples in question. She maintained that the notion of "integral part of aboriginal
peoples' distinctive cultures" referred not to individual aboriginal practices, but
the distinctive cultures from which those practices arose. 90 In light of this
conclusion, L'Heureux-Dube J. agreed with the "social test" formulated by
Lambert J.A. in finding that the courts' emphasis should be placed on the
significance of the activities to the aboriginal peoples, not the activities them-
selves. 9 1
In opposition to the majority's findings, L'Heureux-Dube J. determined that all
practices, traditions, and customs connected to the self-identity and self-preser-
vation of organised aboriginal societies are deserving of protection by section
35(1), regardless of the whether the aboriginal activities described were pre- or
post-contact in origin.92 As she explained, "aboriginal rights must be permitted
to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as
their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall
society in which they live."'93 To be recognised as an aboriginal right,
L'Heureux-Dube J. determined that an aboriginal activity must have formed an
integral part of a distinctive aboriginal culture for a substantial and continuous
88. Supra, note 3 at para. 105.
89. Ibid., at para. 144.
90. Ibid., at paras. 156-7.
91. Ibid., at para. 157.
92. Note L'Heureux-Dube J.'s comments, ibid., at para. 166: 'Taking British sovereignty
as the turning point in aboriginal culture assumes that everything that the natives did
after that date was not sufficiently significant and fundamental to their culture and
social organization."
93. Ibid., at para. 172. Note also her comments at para. 179: "... [D]istinctive aboriginal
culture is not a reality of the past, preserved and exhibited in a museum, but a character-
istic that has evolved with the natives as they have changed, modernized and flourished
over time, along with the rest of Canadian society."
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period of time. She further found that this period of time should be assessed on
the following criteria: the type of aboriginal practices, traditions and customs;
the particular aboriginal culture and society, and; a reference period of roughly
twenty to fifty years. 94 On this basis, she held that the appellant possessed an
aboriginal right to sell salmon for money as a modem incarnation of a traditional
Sto:lo practice of selling and bartering salmon for livelihood, support, and
sustenance purposes. 95
McLachlin J.'s dissenting judgment differed from the other two judgments'
characterisations of what constituted an aboriginal right. She held that courts
must look to "what the law has historically accepted as fundamental aboriginal
rights." 96 In practical terms, this meant adopting an approach that: recognised
that section 35(1) had dual purposes, namely to preclude extinguishment of
rights and to provide a solid foundation for the settlement of aboriginal claims;
was liberal and generous towards aboriginal interests; contextualised the aborig-
inal claim in light of the historic way of life of the people asserting the claim,
and; was faithful to the position of the Crown as a fiduciary to aboriginal peoples
throughout Canadian history.97
In the course of her judgment, McLachlin J. distinguished between aboriginal
rights and their exercise. While she characterised aboriginal rights as being
understood in broad, general terms that remained constant over centuries, she
stated that the exercise of those rights was capable of adopting many forms and
variances in respect of time and place. 98 What had to be determined in Van der
Peer, in her analysis, was whether the appellant possessed an aboriginal right to
sell or barter fish, and, if so, if the manner in which the appellant acted was an
exercise of that right. McLachlin J. held that to ignore this fundamental distinc-
tion was "to freeze aboriginal societies in their ancient modes and deny to them
the right to adapt, as all people must, to the changes in the society in which they
live."99
94. Ibid., at para. 178.
95. Ibid., at para. 202: 'The Indian right to trade his fish is not frozen in time to doing so
only by the medium of the potlach and the like; he is entitled, subject to extinguishment
or justifiable restrictions, to evolve with the times and dispose of them by modem
means, if he so chooses, such as the sale of them for money."
96. Ibid., at para. 227.
97. Ibid., at para. 232.
98. Ibid., at para. 238.
99. Ibid., at para. 240. See also her comments, ibid., at para. 250: "'The modem exercise of
a right may be quite different from its traditional exercise. To deny it the status of a
right because of such differences would be to deny the reality that aboriginal cultures,
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McLachlin J. explicitly rejected the Chief Justice's assertion that aboriginal
rights were comprised only of those rights that existed prior to contact. 100 All
that was necessary under McLachlin J.'s characterisation of aboriginal rights
was an established continuity between the practice at issue and the traditional
right of the aboriginal group in question. 101 She did agree, however, with the
majority's characterisation that incidental rights could not qualify as aboriginal
rights since they were not central to aboriginal cultures or social organisations. 102
From her analysis of the evidence led at trial, she determined that the appellant did
possess an aboriginal right to sell or barter salmon in sufficient levels necessary to
maintain traditional levels of sustenance, namely to provide basic housing, trans-
portation, clothing, and amenities. 103 She characterised this right as "the right to
continue to use the resource in the traditional way to provide for the traditional
needs, albeit in their modem form." 104
The Van der Peet decision is significant for its discussion of the nature and extent
of aboriginal rights and the various attempts by the three judgments in the case
to provide parameters for such a definition. In this sense, it is of much wider
influence and importance than either the Gladstone10 5 or N.T C. Smokehouse10 6
decisions that were released along with it, or the earlier fishing cases of R. v.
Nikal107 and R. v. Lewis.108 Its analysis of aboriginal rights and their existence
transcends its application to fishing rights and extends to the entirety of the
aboriginal rights that may be found to exist under section 35(1) of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982. It is this aspect of Van der Peet that is most noteworthy, not its
discussion of the particular fishing rights at issue before the court. As with the
like all cultures, change and adapt with time."
100. Ibid., at para. 247: "One finds no mention in the text of s. 35(l) or in the jurisprudence
of the moment of European contact as the definitive all-or-nothing time for establishing
an aboriginal right."
101. Ibid.
102. The distinction between integral rights and incidental rights also arose in R. v. Glad-
stone, supra, note 47 and in R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd, supra, note 48, two other
fishing rights cases that were released with the Van der Peet judgment. On other
aspects of aboriginal fishing rights, see R. v. Nikal (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 658
(S.C.C.) andR. v. Lewis (1996) 133 D.L.R. (4th) 700 (S.C.C.).
103. Ibid., at para. 279.
104. Ibid., at para. 278.
105. Supra, note 47.
106. Supra, note 48.
107. Supra, note 102.
108. Supra, note 102.
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Sparrow case before it, the significance of the Van der Peet case in ensuing years
will be for its role as part of the Supreme Court of Canada's first attempts to
grapple with the definition and articulation of aboriginal rights in section 35(1).
R. v. BADGER
An equally noteworthy case dealing with section 35(1) rights decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada this year was R. v. Badger. Unlike Van der Peer, the
Badger case dealt with treaty rights, in particular the right to hunt.
In Badger, the appellants, Messrs. Badger, Kiyawasew, and Ominayak, were
Treaty No. 8 Indians who had all been charged under the Alberta Wildlife Act
while hunting moose on privately owned land within the boundaries of lands
that had been surrendered under the treaty. The treaty, signed in 1899, provided
the aboriginal parties to the treaty with the right to hunt over the territories
surrendered, save for lands that had been taken up for settlement, mining,
lumbering, trading, or other purposes. However, in 1930, the federal government
promulgated the Natural Resource TransferAgreements ("N.R.T.A."), 109 whose
terms overlapped with some of the issues that had been covered by Treaty No.
8. The N.R.T.A. significantly affected the terms of Treaty No. 8, and, in
particular, the rights of the appellants in Badger.
The N.R.T.A. sought to rectify an imbalance caused by the terms creating the
provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. When those provinces were
admitted into Confederation, they did so on less favourable terms than the other
Canadian provinces. The other provinces had retained the beneficial interest in
Crown lands existing within their boundaries, including mineral and resource
rights, through the operation of section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The
statutes creating and admitting Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta into
Confederation had pre-empted the operation of section 109 by providing that
the interests in Crown lands, etc. within the new provincial boundaries would
remain with the federal Crown. The N.R.T.A. was intended to place the prov-
inces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta on an equal footing with the other
Canadian provinces by giving them the same interest in Crown lands existing
within their jurisdictional boundaries.
The transfer of lands and resources from the federal government to Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta through the N.R.T.A. was not unconditional. Each
109. While the abbreviation used is singular, any subsequent references to "N.R.T.A." are to
be read to apply equally to each of the three transfer agreements. Where reference is
intended to be made to only one of the transfer agreements, that distinction will be
made in the text (e.g. "the Alberta N.R.T.A.").
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province had to make land available to the federal Crown to fulfill the outstand-
ing treaty land entitlements 110 owed to the aboriginal peoples:
All lands included in Indian reserves within the Province, including those
selected and surveyed but not yet confirmed, as well as those confirmed,
shall continue to be vested in the Crown and administered by the Govern-
ment of Canada for the purposes of Canada, and the Province will from
time to time, upon the request of the Superintendent General of Indian
Affairs, set aside, out of the unoccupied Crown lands hereby transferred to
its administration, such further areas as the said Superintendent General
may, in agreement with the appropriate Minister of the Province, select as
necessary to enable Canada to fulfill its obligations under the treaties with
the Indians of the Province, and such areas shall thereafter be administered
by Canada in the same way in all respects as if they had never passed to the
Province under the provisions hereof. 111
The N.R.T.A. also provided for the application of provincial game laws to the
aboriginal peoples residing in those provinces:
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the sup-
ply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that
the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall
apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that
the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to
them, of hunting, trapping, and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons
of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which
the said Indians may have a right of access. 112
In addition, the N.R.T.A. allowed for the exercise of aboriginal hunting for food
during all seasons on all unoccupied Crown lands and any other lands to which
the aboriginal peoples had a right of access. The pivotal question before the
Supreme Court of Canada in Badger was whether the appellants had a right of
access to the private lands they were hunting on when they were charged.
The trials and appeals of the three men had been held together. All were convicted
at trial. Their appeals of those convictions were unsuccessful before both the
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench and the Alberta Court of Appeal. At the
Supreme Court of Canada level, the appeals of Messrs. Badger and Kiyawasew
110. Treaty land entitlements are promises of land made to aboriginal groups in treaties,
such as a grant of a designated amount of land (e.g. one half-acre) to each individual in
a signatory band.
111. See S.C. 1930, c. 29, s. 11, S.C. 1930, c. 41, s. 10, and S.C. 1930, c. 3, s. 10, which
were incorporated into the Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V., c. 26.
112. S.C. 1930, c. 29, s. 13, S.C. 1930, c. 41,s. 12, and S.C. 1930, c. 3, s. 12.
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were dismissed. The court found that the land they had been hunting on was
visibly being used and thus constituted land to which they had no right of access
either under Treaty No. 8 or the N.R.T.A. 113 As for Mr. Ominayak, his appeal
was allowed and a new trial directed.
The primary judgment in Badger was rendered by Cory J. It agreed with the
precedent established by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v.
Horseman114 that the hunting rights guaranteed under Treaty No. 8 had been
"merged and consolidated" by the N.R.T.A. Cory J. found that this merger and
consolidation eliminated the commercial aspect of those rights that had existed
under Treaty No. 8 and expanded the scope of the territory over which the right
to hunt for food could be pursued. Unlike the earlier decision in Horseman,
however, he found that the N.R.T.A. did not extinguish or replace the hunting
rights guaranteed under the treaty. Instead, it merely modified those rights where
they came into conflict with'the N.R.T.A. As he explained:
... mhe existence of the NRTA has not deprived Treaty No. 8 of legal sig-
nificance. Treaties are sacred promises and the Crown's honour requires the
Court to assume that the Crown intended to fulfil its promises. Treaty rights
can only be amended where it is clear that effect was intended. ... [T]he
Treaty No. 8 right to hunt has only been altered or modified by the NRTA to
the extent that the NRTA evinces a clear intention to effect such a modifica-
tion. ... Unless there is a direct conflict between the NRTA and a treaty, the
NRTA will not have modified the treaty rights.115
Cory J. found that the rights guaranteed under Treaty No. 8 were not unlimited
and were explicitly made subject to future regulation. Nevertheless, he
explained that the N.R.T.A. language outlining the right to hunt for food must
be understood in conjunction with the promises made to the aboriginal peoples
in Treaty No. 8.116 Both Treaty No. 8 and the N.R.T.A. circumscribed the area
within which the right to hunt for food could be exercised. The areas in which
the appellants had been hunting had been lands included in the 1899 surrender,
but were privately owned at the time of the appeal. As mentioned earlier, the
treaty provided the aboriginal signatories with the right to hunt over the territo-
113. The court found that the treaty right to hunt for food extended to private land, but only
to private land where such hunting would not be incompatible with the use that the land
was being put to. The test established by the Supreme Court in Badger to make this
determination was what it referred to as the "visible, incompatible use" test. See ibid., at
paras. 49-66.
114. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901.
115. Supra, note 4 at 342-3.
116. Ibid.,at 343.
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ries surrendered, save for lands that had been taken up for settlement, mining,
lumbering, trading, or other purposes. Therefore, even if the lands hunted upon
by the appellants were privately owned, they had to be "taken up" in the manner
described in the treaty to prevent the appellants from being able to exercise treaty
hunting rights over them. 117
Cory J. found that evidence led at trial indicated that in 1899, the Treaty No. 8
Indians would have understood that land was being "taken up" when it was put
to a use incompatible with hunting. While they would not have understood the
concept of private ownership, they would have understood that lands were
"taken up" and not available for hunting when buildings or fences were erected,
or the lands were visibly being used as farms. However, abandoned buildings
would not necessarily signify that lands were "taken up" in a manner so as to
prohibit the exercise of their treaty hunting rights. 118 Thus, Cory J. concluded
that interpreting the treaty according to the aboriginal peoples' understanding
of its terms meant that the geographical limitation to be imposed was one based
on the concept of "visible, incompatible land use." 119 He found that the oral
history of the Treaty No. 8 Indians revealed a similar understanding of the treaty
and its promises. 120 The question, then, in the case before him was whether the
appellants were hunting on lands put to visible, incompatible use. If so, they
could not rely on the protection of their treaty rights.
Mr. Badger, had been hunting a moose on brush land with willow regrowth and
scrub when he was charged. There were no fences or signs posted on the land
indicating that it was private property. There was, however, a farm house located
a quarter of a mile from where Mr. Badger shot the moose. Moreover, the farm
house did not appear to be abandoned. Mr. Kiyawasew had been charged while
hunting on a snow-covered field without fences. He had testified that he had
passed old and run-down barns and that signs were posted on the land, but he
was unable to read them from the road. Evidence indicated that in the fall, a crop
had been harvested from the field he was hunting on. Mr. Ominayak had been
charged while hunting on uncleared muskeg, with no fences, signs, or buildings
in the vicinity of where he had shot a moose. While the situations involving
Messrs. Badger and Kiyawasew were held to have failed the "visible, incompati-
ble land use" test, Mr. Ominayak's situation was not as clear.
117. Ibid., at 344.
118. Ibid.,at345.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., at 347-8.
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In looking to the regulations imposed on Mr. Ominayak by the Alberta Wildlife
Act, which applied by virtue of section 12 of the N.R.T.A., 121 Cory J. determined
that the existence of conservationist legislation in effect at the time Treaty No.
8 was signed indicated that conservation was a legitimate basis for limiting
treaty rights and was understood by the Indians as such. 122 Cory J. determined
that paragraph 12 of the Alberta N.R.T.A. explicitly contemplated the limiting
of hunting through provincial legislation designed for conservation purposes.123
Consequently, he concluded that, by the terms of the treaty and the N.R.T.A.,
the provincial legislation would apply to Mr. Ominayak as long as it was aimed
at the conservation of game.124 Cory J. found, however, that the licensing
provisions of the Wildlife Act were only partially directed towards conservation
issues. Therefore, he held that ascertaining whether the Act's requirement that
Mr. Ominayak obtain a licence to hunt infringed upon his rights under Treaty
No. 8, as modified by the N.R.T.A., should be determined by using the justifi-
catory test created in Sparrow. 12 5
Cory J. determined that the licensing scheme for hunting established by the
Wildlife Act and its regulations resulted in a prima facie infringement of the
right to hunt established by Treaty No. 8, as modified by the N.R.T.A. 126 The
licensing scheme was held to have two objectives: public safety and conser-
vation. The public safety aspect was found not to infringe the modified treaty
right to hunt; however, the conservation goal was deemed to have had the
effect of limiting the modified treaty right to hunt, thereby infringing that
121. In the absence of section 12 of the N.R.T.A., the Wildlife Act would not have applied to
this situation. Aboriginal peoples fall under exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction by
virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. While section 88 of the Indian
Act allows provincial laws of general application to apply to status Indians by referen-
tial incorporation, the operation of section 88 would be precluded in the Badger situa-
tion since section 88 applies only where the subject matter is not covered by a treaty.
Since the hunting rights in question were derived from Treaty No. 8, section 88 would
not apply.
122. Supra, note 4 at 352. It is suggested that determining, on the one hand, that the aborigi-
nal signatories understood that conservation was a legitimate basis for limiting treaty
hunting rights and concluding, on the other, that implementing Crown legislation for
that purpose would be understood as an instrument of conservationist purposes by the
aboriginals is a more complicated link than Cory J. suggests in Badger and requires
more evidence than that cited in his judgment.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., at 353.
125. Ibid. See the discussion of Cory J.' s application of the Sparrow test to situations involv-
ing treaty rights, infra.
126. Ibid., at 357.
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right.127 While, on Cory J.'s application of the Sparrowjustificatory test to treaty
rights, provincial regulations aimed at conservation were held to be valid if they
were not unreasonable in their infringement of those rights, he determined that
the Wildlife Act's licensing requirements did constitute an unreasonable
infringement. The Act purported to require Treaty No. 8 Indians to apply and
pay for licences to exercise their treaty rights to hunt; moreover, it did not
provide for aboriginals' preferential access to the limited number of licences
available. Cory J. found that this effect clearly conflicted with the treaty and
N.R.T.A. provisions. 12 8 As he explained:
The present licensing system denies to holders of treaty rights as modified
by the NRTA the very means of exercising those rights. Limitations of this
nature are in direct conflict with the treaty right. Therefore, it must be con-
cluded that s. 26(1) of the Wildlife Act conflicts with the hunting right set
out in Treaty No. 8 as modified by the NRTA. 129
Having demonstrated the existence of a prima facie infringement of Mr.
Ominayak's modified treaty right to hunt, Cory J. held that the provincial
government had to justify that infringement according to the standard estab-
lished in Sp.arrow.130 However, at trial, the provincial government had not led
any evidence with respect to the justification of its infringement upon the
modified treaty hunting rights. Cory J. determined that in the absence of such
evidence, the Supreme Court could not supply its own justification; therefore,
he ordered a new trial in order to deal with the justification question. 13 1
The additional reasons provided by Sopinka J. agreed with the disposition of
the appeal and the reasons thereof provided by Cory J., with the exception of
his handling of the relationship between Treaty No. 8, the N.R.T.A., and section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Rather than viewing the N.R.T.A. as
amending the rights contained in the treaty, as Cory J. had done, Sopinka J.
regarded the N.R.T.A. as replacing the treaty rights entirely:
To characterize the NRTA as modifying the Treaty is to treat it as an amend-
ing document to the Treaty. This clearly was not the intent of the NRTA.
127. Ibid., at 358.
128. Ibid., at 359-60.
129. Ibid., at 360.
130. Cory J. held that, by virtue of section 12 of the N.R.T.A., the provincial government
occupied the same position that the federal government had occupied in Sparrow, there-
fore it had to justify the imposition of its regulations in the manner established by the
Sparrow test: see ibid.
131. Ibid.,at361.
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If the NRTA merely modified the Treaty, an Indian hunting on Treaty lands
could claim the right under the Treaty while an Indian hunting in other parts
of the province could claim only under the N'RTA.... It might be suggested
that the NRTA both amended the Treaty and, as an independent constitu-
tional document, amended the Constitution. If this were the intent; it is dif-
ficult to understand why all the terms of the Treaty relating to the right to
hunt for food were replicated in the NRTA. 132
Consequently, Sopinka J. held that, after the passage of the N.R.T.A., it was the
sole source of the right of aboriginal peoples to hunt for food that had been
provided in Treaty No. 8:
... Mhe proper characterization of the relationship between the NRTA and
the Treaty rights is that the sole source for a claim involving the right to hunt
for food is the NRTA. The Treaty rights have been subsumed in a document of
a higher order. The Treaty may be relied on for the purpose of assisting in the
interpretation of the NRTA, but it has no other legal significance.1 33
Since Sopinka J. found that the N.R.T.A. was the sole source of the aboriginal
right to hunt for food, he determined that that right was not a treaty right
protected by section 35(1). The right still received constitutional protection, but
as a result of the fact that the N.R.T.A. was, itself, a constitutional document. 134
Although the rights asserted by the appellants were found by Sopinka J. not to
be section 35(1) treaty rights, he held that the canons of treaty interpretation
were nevertheless applicable since they arise "out of the nature of the relation-
ship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples." 135 He found that the
N.R.T.A.'s protection of aboriginal rights to hunt for food was not absolute, but
was expressly subject to justifiable limitation, such as legislation premised on
conservationist practices and principles. 136 Despite his disagreement over Cory
132. Ibid., at 330.
133. Ibid.,at 331.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.:
These principles apply equally to the rights protected by the NRTA; the principles
arise out of the nature of the relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples
with the result that, whatever document in which that relationship has been
articulated, the principles should apply to the interpretation of that document.
I find support for this reasoning in the prior decisions of this Court concerning
the interpretation of the NRTA.
136. Ibid., at 332:
At the time the treaties that preceded the NRTA were signed, there was already
in place legislation enacted for conservation purposes which affected the
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J.'s characterisation of the rights in issue, Sopinka J. did agree with his finding
that the determination of whether the constitutionally-protected rights of aborig-
inals to hunt for food under the N.R.T.A. could be limited by legislation was to
be made by analogy to the Sparrow justificatory test:
Although the Sparrow test was developed in the context of s. 35(1), the
basic thrust of the test, to protect aboriginal rights but also to permit gov-
ernments to legislate for legitimate purposes where the legislation is a justi-
fiable infringement on those protected rights, applies equally well to the
regulatory authority granted to the provinces under para. 12 of the NRTA as
to federal power to legislate in respect of Indians. 137
The Badger decision is significant for its discussion of the important status of
Indian treaties under Canadian law, as well as for its statements regarding the
responsibilities of the Crown under the treaties and its emphasis on looking at
treaties in light of aboriginal understandings. In fact, the Badger decision
consolidates many of the principles of treaty interpretation that have been
formulated over the years by the Supreme Court. 13 8 Despite its recognition of
the solemnity of treaties and the necessity of upholding the honour of the Crown
throughout its dealings with the aboriginal peoples, 139 the Badger decision
marks the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Crown's ability to unilaterally
extinguish, modify, or alter existing treaty rights, as was held to have been done
by the N.R.T.A. Such a finding runs contrary to the Crown's general fiduciary
Indians' rights. Indeed, there existed total bans on the hunting of certain species.
As a result, at the time the treaties were signed and, even more so, at the time
the NRTA was agreed to by the provinces and the federal government, it would
have been clearly understood that the rights of Indians pursuant to either
document would be subject to governmental regulation for conservation
purposes. The rights protected by the NRTA thus cannot be viewed as being
constitutional rights of an absolute nature for which governmental regulation is
prohibited.
137. Ibid., at 333-4.
138. Ibid., at 331, per SopinkaJ.
139. Ibid., per Sopinka J.: "... mreaties should be interpreted in a manner that maintains the
integrity of the Crown, particularly the Crown's fiduciary obligation toward aboriginal
peoples." See also ibid., at 340, per Cory J.:
... [A] treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the Crown
and the various Indian nations. It is an agreement whose nature is sacred....
mhe honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealing with Indian people.
Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon
treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the
integrity of the Crown. It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its
promises. No appearance of "sharp dealing" will be sanctioned.
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duty to act in the best interests of aboriginal peoples as well as its specific treaty
obligations under the various treaties affected by the N.R.T.A. Maintaining the
honour of the Crown and avoiding sharp practice in all dealings with aboriginal
peoples, principles explicitly endorsed in Badger,140 are clearly offended by
finding that the effects of the N.R.T.A. may, unilaterally and without consulta-
tion or consent, override or alter the nature of solemn, pre-existing agreements.
This was recognised by the additional reasons provided by Kerans J.A. in the
Alberta Court of Appeal's disposition of Badger:
My concern is that whatever happened in 1930 happened without the partic-
ipation of one party to the Treaty. The aboriginal Canadians were not
invited to participate in the negotiations leading to the 1930 agreement. I
incline to the view that they did not believe they were changing any native
rights. I fear the notion of "merger and consolidation" is the result of a
patina applied by a later generation of judicial interpretation. That is the
reason for my disquiet, and for these additional reasons. 14 1
Another difficulty with the Badger decision is that Cory J. concluded that the
justificatory test formulated in the Sparrow decision, a case dealing exclusively
with aboriginal rights, applied equally to treaty rights "in most cases." 14 2 This
finding is problematic because of the significant distinctions that exist between
aboriginal rights and treaty rights. 143 Meanwhile, why the application of the
Sparrow test to treaty rights in Badger was qualified to render it applicable only
to "most cases" as opposed to all cases, was not discussed in Cory J.'s judgment.
In making the Sparrow test applicable to treaty rights, at least in the matter
before the court in Badger, Cory J. expressly noted the distinction between
aboriginal and treaty rights. As he explained:
There is no doubt that aboriginal and treaty rights differ in both origin and
structure. Aboriginal rights flow from the customs and traditions of the
native peoples. To paraphrase the words of Judson J. in Calder ... they
embody the right of native people to continue living as their forefathers
lived. Treaty rights, on the other hand, are those contained in official agree-
ments between the Crown and the native peoples. Treaties are analogous to
140. Supra, note 139.
141. (1993), 8 Alta. L.R. (3d) 354 (C.A.), at 361.
142. Supra, note 4 at 354. Note, however, the opposition to the imposition of the Sparrow
test to the situation before the court by Sopinka J., ibid. Despite this opposition,
Sopinka J. did find that the principles underlying the Sparrow test, though not the test
itself, were applicable to the facts in Badger.
143. This topic is discussed in greater detail in L.I. Rotman, "Defining Parameters: Aborigi-
nal Rights, Treaty Rights, and the Sparrow Justificatory Test," (forthcoming).
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contracts, albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature. They create
enforceable obligations based on the mutual consent of the parties. It fol-
lows that the scope of treaty rights will be determined by their wording,
which must be interpreted in accordance with the principles enunciated by
this Court.144
Cory J. also found that there were "significant aspects of similarity" between
aboriginal rights and treaty rights. Specifically, he held that:
Although treaty rights are the result of mutual agreement, they, like aborigi-
nal rights, may be unilaterally abridged. See Horseman, supra, at p. 936; R.
v. Sikyea, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 325 (N.W.T.C.A.), at p. 330, aff'd [1964] S.C.R.
642; and Moosehunter, supra, at p. 293. It follows that limitations on treaty
rights, like breaches of aboriginal rights, should be justified.
In addition, both aboriginal and treaty rights possess in common a unique,
sui generis nature. ... In each case, the honour of the Crown is engaged
through its relationship with the native peoples. 145
On the basis of these similarities, as well as the wording of section 35(1) -
which he found "supports a common approach to infringements of aboriginal
and treaty rights" 146 - Cory J. found that the Sparrow test was applicable to
the situation in Badger.
From Cory J.'s consideration of the similarities and differences between
aboriginal and treaty rights in Badger, it would appear that the basis for his
decision rests simply upon the fact that aboriginal and treaty rights are
grouped together in section 35(1) rather than because of any reasoned
analysis of why aboriginal and treaty rights should be treated equally with
respect to their limitation by governmental legislative initiatives. Despite
offering a cursory discussion of the nature of aboriginal and treaty rights,
Cory J. provides no additional reasoning on which to found his conclusion. It
would appear, however, that he did not want his judgment in Badger to be
understood as an authoritative proposition for the notion that the Sparrow test
automatically applies to potential legislative infringement of both aboriginal and
treaty rights. Just as he had stated earlier in his judgment that the Sparrow test
applies equally to treaty rights "in most cases," he prefaced his conclusions by
stating that, in justifying legislative infringements of treaty rights, "the recog-
nized principles to be considered and applied in justification should generally
144. Supra, note 4 at 354.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid., at 355.
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be those set out in Sparrow..."147 While Cory J. found that the principles
established in Sparrow were not exhaustive, he explained that they "may serve
as a rough guide when considering the infringement of treaty rights. ' 148 From
the tone of his judgment, as well as its self-imposed qualifications, Cory J.'s
decision in Badger can hardly be understood as a hearty endorsement of the
mandatory application of the Sparrow test to treaty rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments in Badger are offensive to the solemn
and binding nature of Crown-Native treaties, the representations of the Crown
therein, and in the negotiations leading up to their conclusion. The Supreme
Court's acceptance of the Crown's actions in unilaterally extinguishing, modi-
fying, or altering the terms of solemn and binding treaties that it had entered
into with the aboriginal peoples is repugnant to the Crown's position as fiduciary
and the concomitant responsibilities it owes to its beneficiaries. 149 Finally, the
constitutional affirmation and protection of aboriginal and treaty rights in
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which incorporates the Crown's
fiduciary duty to Native peoples, is, itself, offended by the Crown's powers as
described in Badger. While Canadian courts have ruled that it was within the
legislative ability of the Crown to extinguish, modify, or alter aboriginal or treaty
rights prior to 17 April 1982,150 those courts have never answered whether
taking such action offends the Crown's pre-existing fiduciary obligations to the
aboriginal peoples.
147. Ibid., at 356 (Emphasis added).
148. Ibid., at 357.
149. Indeed, it is not possible to simultaneously act in the best interests of the aboriginal
peoples and unilaterally eliminate rights that had been guaranteed to them in treaties.
150. Note, for example, Simon v. R. (1984), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 390 (S.C.C.), at 409, where it
held that, subject to the limitation imposed by section 35(1), it is "within the exclusive
power of Parliament under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, to derogate from
rights recognized in a treaty agreement made with the Indians." See also R. v. Sikyea
(1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 (N.W.T.C.A.), at 154:
It is always to be kept in mind that the Indians surrendered their rights in the
territory in exchange for these promises. This "promise and agreement", like
any other, can, of course, be breached, and there is no law of which I am aware
that would prevent Parliament by legislation, properly within s.91 of the B.N.A.
Act, from doing so.
These comments in Simon and Sikyea are representative of pre-section 35(1) jurispru-
dence, which held that aboriginal and treaty rights could be extinguished at will be the
federal Crown pursuant to its section 91(24) powers.
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BLUEBERRY RIVER INDIAN BAND v. CANADA (DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT)
The Crown's fiduciary obligations to aboriginal peoples was the central issue in the
Blueberry River case, also known as the Apsassin case, which concerned the
surrender of land and mineral rights that had been obtained under an adhesion to
Treaty No. 8 signed in 1900. The people represented in the Apsassin action were
members of the Blueberry River and Doig River Bands. Prior to 1977, they had all
been members of the same band, known from 1962 to 1977 as the Fort St. John Band
and, prior to that, the Beaver Band of Fort St. John. Since all persons represented in
the Apsassin action were either Dunne-Za or Cree by linguistic grouping, they will
be collectively referred to herein as the 'Dunne-Za.Cree," as they were by the
Federal Court of Appeal in its disposition of the Apsassin case. 151
Traditionally, the Dunne-Za Cree were hunting and trapping people who lived
in and around the Peace River country in northeastern British Columbia. Until
the latter part of the nineteenth century, they had remained relatively free of
settler incursions into their territory. In 1899, spurred on by geological surveys
that indicated that territories in the northwestern parts of Canada likely con-
tained valuable mineral and oil deposits, the effects of the discovery of gold in
the Klondike in 1896,152 and increased settler activity, the federal gov-
ernment commenced treaty negotiations with the aboriginal peoples
occupying lands in the extreme northwest corner of Saskatchewan, most
of northern Alberta, part of the Northwest Territories, and northeastern
British Columbia lying to the east of the Rocky Mountains, including the
Peace River country. While there had been reports prior to the treaty
negotiations that the aboriginal peoples in these areas were suffering from
151. [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 20 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter "Apsassin, FCA"].
152. See the report from J. Walker, formerly of the North West Mounted Police to the Dep-
uty Superintendent General, Department of Indian Affairs, 30 Nov. 1897, RG 10 Public
Archives of Canada, Ottawa, 3848: 75236-1, as reproduced in R. Daniel, 'The Spirit
and Terms of Treaty Eight," in R. Price, ed., The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties,
(Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1987), at 65:
From all appearance there will be a rush of miners and others to the Yukon
and the mineral regions of the Peace, Liard and other rivers in Athabasca during the
next year ... others intend to establish stopping places, trading posts, transportation
companies and to take up ranches and homesteads in fertile lands of the Peace
River. ... They (the Indians) will be more easily dealt with now than they would
be when their country is overrun with prospectors and valuable mines be
discovered.
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famine,153 that fact appeared to have had little effect on the government's
desire to enter into treaty negotiations. 154
Upon surrendering their traditional lands to the Crown under Treaty No. 8, the
Dunne-Za Cree were promised a reserve that would be set aside for them
whenever the state of non-aboriginal settlement necessitated the establishment
of a reserve. Until that time, the Dunne-Za Cree were to have their regular use
of their traditional territory. A reserve was set aside for the Dunne-Za Cree by
Order in Council in 1916 and designated as Indian Reserve No. 172 ("IR 172").
In 1940, a private individual applied for a permit to explore for oil on IR 172.
Subsequently, the Crown obtained a surrender of the Dunne-Za Cree's mineral
rights to the reserve for the purposes of leasing them for the Dunne-Za Cree's
benefit. An exploration permit was then issued, with the money received being
credited to the Dunne-Za Cree. In the latter stages of World War II, oil and gas
exploration was conducted on and in the vicinity of IR 172. Around this same
time, interest in IR 172 was peaked on another ground.
Near the end of World War f1, the Minister of Mines and Resources, J. Allison
Glen - whose portfolio included Indian Affairs as well as acquiring land for
returning war veterans - expressed interest in obtaining the surrender of IR
172 so that land could be made available for the veterans and their families. 155
Glen initiated a series of events which culminated in the surrender of the reserve
in September, 1945.156 Although the reserve was appraised at $93,000, negoti-
ations between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
153. There had been long periods of famine in the area in the nineteenth century which the
Canadian government only became fully aware of after the surrender of Rupert's Land
by the Hudson's Bay Company to Canada in 1870. For example, as Daniel, ibid.,
explained at 56-7: "During the winter of 1887-88, there were reports that Indians in
Fort St. John were killing their horses for food, that one of the Hudson's Bay
Company's cattle had been killed, and that more might be killed unless the government
aided the Indians and also brought law to the area."
154. Indeed, little aid had been provided to the aboriginal peoples residing in these areas
prior to the signing of Treaty No. 8. Moreover, as Daniel indicates, ibid., at 58, "...
[When Treaty Eight was finally signed, it did not include the Isle _ la Crosse area from
which there had been many reports of hardship and requests for a treaty, but did include
most of the areas of known mineral wealth and agricultural value."
155. Supra, note 151 at 35-6.
156. Glen's actions contradicted the Department of Indian Affairs' ("DIAND") policy
against the sale of surplus Indian reserve lands, as indicated in the Director's Annual
Reports of 1939 and 1945, as noted, ibid., at 32, per Stone J.A., and at 76, per Isaac C.J.
This point was not discussed by the trial judge in his reasons for judgment despite its
corroboration by expert evidence on governmental policies and administrative practices
relating to Indian affairs in Canada.
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("DIAND") and the Director, the Veterans' Land Act1 57 ("DVLA"), who had
assumed the responsibility of acquiring lands for the returning veterans, resulted
in only $70,000 being paid for the reserve. 158 Title to IR 172 was then transferred
to DVLA by Letters Patent, 159 whereupon, between, 1948 and 1956, it was
subdivided and all but four lots sold to veterans by way of agreements of sale.
Some of the money paid for IR 172 was used by DIAND in 1950 to purchased
other lands further north, nearer to the trap lines, which were to become the
Dunne-Za Cree's new reserves. The four remaining lots, which were unsuitable
for farming, were retained by DVLA until 1977, when they were sold to oil
companies.
When the Fort St. John Band was divided into the Blueberry River and Doig
River Bands in 1977, a concerned DIAND officer inquired into when the
Dunne-Za Cree had lost the mineral rights to IR 172. He brought his discoveries
to the attention of the Dunne-Za Cree and advised them to see a lawyer. In
September, 1978, the Dunne-Za Cree commenced an action against the Crown
alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary obligation, and fraud.
At trial, 160 Addy J. found that the Crown had a fiduciary duty to the Dunne-Za
Cree that arose upon their surrender of IR 172 in 1945. That duty did not arise
upon the surrender of the mineral rights to IR 172 in 1940, though. The nature
of the Crown's duty, according to Addy J., was to take all reasonable efforts to
secure the best possible price for IR 172.161 This meant that DIAND, which had
obtained the surrender, was charged with the onus of demonstrating that it had
obtained a full and fair purchase price from DVLA. By failing to discharge that
onus, DIAND was found to have breached its duty. DIAND was not held liable
for the breach, however, due to the lapse of the applicable statutory limitation
period for such a claim.
Under Addy J.'s formulation, the Crown's duty with respect to IR 172, which
was administered by DIAND, ceased once the Letters Patent had been issued to
157. The Veterans' Land Act, 1942, 6 Geo. VI, c. 33.
158. Note that when these negotiations began, DIAND and DVLA were both under the juris-
diction of the Minister of Mines and Resources.
159. An instrument issued by the Crown which grants or confirms the patentee's right to
exclusive possession and enjoyment of land.
160. [1988] 3 F.C. 20 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter "Apsassin, FCTD"]. The complete text of the
reasons for judgment at trial is reported as Blueberry River Indian Band and Doig River
Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) (1987),
14 F.T.R. 161 (F.C.T.D.).
161. Ibid., note 160 at 75-6.
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DVLA in 1948. The fiduciary duty that had been attached to the reserve was
then transformed into a duty attached to the proceeds, which remained with
DIAND; it did not follow the title to the reserve into DVLA's hands. In any
event, Addy J. determined that DVLA was a corporation sole, 162 in which
capacity it obtained and held the land for the purposes set forth in The Veterans'
LandAct, 1942.163 As a result, he concluded that the sale from DIAND to DVLA
was, in effect, a sale from the Crown to an independent third party, thereby
removing any appearance of self-dealing on the part of the Crown. He also
exonerated DIAND from having committed, or intending to commit, fraud or
wilfully concealing its actions from the Dunne-Za Cree.
The Dunne-Za Cree appealed the trial court's decision, alleging that the Crown
breached its fiduciary obligations arising both prior and subsequent to the 1945
surrender. They also claimed that the Crown's fiduciary obligations relating to
IR 172 were not extinguished by the transfer of title to the reserve to DVLA,
but remained outstanding until the divided parcels of the reserve were deeded
to individual purchasers. Further, they insisted that their claims were not
statute-barred or prohibited by laches. The Crown cross-appealed the trial
judge's finding that it had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to obtain the
highest possible price for the sale of IR 172. The majority judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal, Isaac C.J. dissenting, dismissed the appeal and the
cross-appeal. 164
The majority determined that DIAND had a fiduciary obligation to advise the
Dunne-Za Cree whether it was in their best interests to surrender their reserve
for sale or lease. That duty stood ahead of the Crown's own desire to obtain IR
172 for distribution to the returning veterans. Nevertheless, on the basis of the
evidence presented and the precedent established by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K"'165 - which held that an appellate court
should not reverse a trial judge's finding of fact absent "palpable and overriding
error" which affected the judge's assessment of the factual evidence presented
- the majority held that the Crown did not breach its duty to the Dunne-Za Cree
prior to and including the 1945 surrender. The majority decision also agreed
with the trial judgment in affirming that DIAND's fiduciary obligation attached
162. A corporation sole is a corporation consisting of only one person, whose successor
becomes the corporation on the former's death or resignation.
163. Under section 5(1) of the Act.
164. Supra, note 151.
165. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802. See also the further references given in Apsassin, FCA, supra,
note 151 at 46, in particular the case of Ontario (Attorney-General) v. Bear Island
Foundation (1991), 83 D.L.R. (4th) 381 (S.C.C.).
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to IR 172 ceased once the reserve was vested in DVLA in 1948. DVLA was
found to be an agent of the Crown only for the purposes authorised by the
Veteran's Land Act, which did not contemplate a transfer of any fiduciary
responsibilities attached to IR 172.
In his dissenting judgment, Isaac C.J. determined that the mineral rights surren-
dered by the Dunne-Za Cree to DIAND in 1940 were not included in the
surrender of IR 172 by DIAND to DVLA in 1945. Isaac C.J. insisted that the
Crown breached its fiduciary duty relating to the mineral rights in either of two
ways: by failing to inform the Dunne-Za Cree that the 1945 surrender was
intended to include the mineral rights, if that was indeed the case, and; that it
intended to sell rather than lease those rights, contrary to the terms of the 1940
surrender. Isaac C.J. also determined that the transfer of title to IR 172 by
DIAND to DVLA was not a sale from the Crown to an independent third party,
but an administrative transfer between Crown agencies pending the sale of the
land to the returning war veterans. 166 He disagreed with the trial and majority
judgments in finding that the Crown's fiduciary obligations regarding the
mineral and surface rights to IR 172 continued beyond 1948 - when the Letters
Patent had been issued to DVLA - and lasted until 1977, when the last parcels
of IR 172 was sold by DVLA.
From these findings, Isaac C.J. held that the Crown had breached its fiduciary
duty to the Dunne-Za Cree as of the date of conveyance and was liable for the
damages flowing from the breach. He further held that the Dunne-Za Cree's
action was not statute-barred. 167 Citing the case of M.(K.) v. M.(H.), 168 he
favourably analogised the applicability of statutory limitation periods in the
166. As a result, Isaac C.J. found that the negotiations between DIAND and DVLA over I.R.
172 amounted to what he described as "a case of self-dealing in its most elementary
form," Apsassin, FCA, supra, note 151 at 88. See also his reasoning, ibid., at 88-93,
including the cases cited therein which stand for the proposition that, for the purposes
of holding and acquiring land, DVLA was a representative of the Crown.
167. From his consideration of the circumstances, including the Dunne-Za Cree's reliance
upon the Crown's advice as recently as 1978, Isaac C.J. fixed 1975 as the date for the
commencement of the statutory limitation period. This date is based upon Isaac C.J.'s
statement that this was when the Dunne-Za Cree were advised to seek legal counsel by
their District Manager see Apsassin, FCA, supra, note 151 at 96. Note, however, that at
78, Isaac C.J. indicated that the Dunne-Za Cree dated their first expression of their legal
rights vis-a-vis I.R. 172 in 1977, which they maintained was when they were first
advised to seek legal counsel by their District Manager.
168. (1992), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.), where La Forest J. stressed the importance of
using a broad, contextual view of the matters in issue and to consider the legislative
intent behind statutes of limitation when determining whether parties ought to be pre-
cluded from commencing actions to enforce their rights by the passage of time.
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Apsassin situation with their application to victims of childhood sexual abuse.
Moreover, on the basis of Dickson J.'s judgment in Guerin v. R.,169 he deter-
mined that the Crown's actions constituted equitable fraud. In finding that the
Crown had breached its fiduciary duty to the Dunne-Za Cree, Isaac C.J. dis-
missed the Crown's cross-appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada's disposition of Apsassin departed largely from
the rationales underlying the judgments rendered by the courts below. 170 The
court was divided over whether the 1940 surrender of mineral rights for lease
was subsumed under the 1945 surrender of IR 172 for sale or lease. Gonthier J.,
for the majority, held that it was, while McLachlin J., with Cory and Major JJ.
concurring, determined that the two surrenders were mutually exclusive.
Despite the judges' disagreement, the court unanimously held - in contrast to
Stone J.A.'s majority decision at the Federal Court of Appeal, but in agreement
with Addy J.'s determination at trial - that the Crown did not hold any fiduciary
duty to the Dunne-Za Cree prior to the surrenders. 171 McLachlin J. found,
instead, that the Crown only owes Indian bands a duty to prevent them from
being exploited in the surrender of their lands. 172 The court agreed, however,
with the trial judge's assessment that the Crown did not breach any duty to the
band by way of the 1945 surrender. 173
The Supreme Court found that the Crown was under a fiduciary obligation to
deal with both the surface and mineral rights in the best interests of the Dunne-Za
Cree once they had been surrendered. This duty encompassed both the monetary
aspects of the transaction and whether the surrender was conducive to the
Dunne-Za Cree's best interests at large. 174 The court overturned the earlier
decisions in Apsassin by finding that the Crown had not breached its duty with
169. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.), especially at 345.
170. Supra, note 5 (hereinafter "Apsassin, SCC').
171. Ibid., at 204, per Gonthier J., and at 210, per McLachlin J.
172. Ibid., at 208. See the discussion of this point, below.
173. As McLachlin J. stated, ibid., at 214:
The interests and wishes of the Band were given utmost consideration throughout.
The choice that was made - to sell the land - possessed the advantage of
allowing the Band to get other lands nearer its trap lines. At the time, that was a
defensible choice. Indeed, it can be argued that the sale of the surface rights was
the only alternative that met the Band's apparent need to obtain land nearer its
trap lines. In retrospect, with the decline of trapping and the discovery of oil and
gas, the decision may be argued to have been unfortunate. But at the time, it may
be defended as a reasonable solution to the problems the Band faced.
174. Ibid., at 212.
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regard to the surface rights to IR 172. It found that the $70,000 price obtained
for the reserve was not unreasonable in the circumstances. 175 However, the court
held that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty to the band when it transferred
the mineral rights to IR 172 to DVLA for no consideration in 1948 since that
action was inconsistent with the band's best interests. 176
Although the court held that the transfer of mineral rights from DIAND to
DVLA constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, it found that the transfer of rights
to IR 172 was not accompanied by a transfer of the former's fiduciary duty to
the latter.177 Consequently, DVLA could not be held responsible for a breach of
fiduciary duty to the Dunne-Za Cree since it never possessed such a duty.
Meanwhile, because of the effects of the applicable provincial limitations legisla-
tion, the court held that DIAND could not be held liable for its breach of duty relating
to the transfer of mineral rights to DVLA. The Supreme Court did find the Crown
liable for a second breach of fiduciary duty, however, on grounds not considered
by the lower courts. It determined that DIAND's transfer of the mineral rights to
DVLA was an error or mistake. Meanwhile, section 64 of the 1927 Indian Act
allowed the Crown to revoke any sale or lease issued in error or mistake, even
against bona fide purchasers. The court determined that DIAND was under a
175. Ibid., at 214-15:
While the DIA received a higher appraisal, there were also appraisals giving
lower value to the land. In fact, there appears to have been no alternate market for
the land at the time, which might be expected to make accurate appraisal
difficult. The evidence reveals the price was arrived at after a course of
negotiations conducted at arm's length between the DIA and the DVLA.
176. Ibid., at 230:
The matter comes down to this. The duty on the Crown as fiduciary was "that
of a man of ordinary prudence in managing his own affairs": Fales v. Canada
Permanent Trust Co., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 302 at p. 315. A reasonable person does
not inadvertently give away a potentially valuable asset which has already
demonstrated earning potential. Nor does a reasonable person give away
for no consideration what it will cost him nothing to keep and which
may one day possess value, however remote the possibility. The Crown
managing its own affairs reserved out its minerals. It should have done
the same for the Band.
177. Ibid.,at 231:
Although the transfer was from one Crown entity to another, it remained a transfer
and an alienation of title.... In summary, the crystallization of the property interest
into a monetary sum and the practical considerations negating a duty in the D.V.L.A.
toward the Band negate the suggestion that the 1948 transfer changed nothing and
that the real alienation came later.
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fiduciary duty to use this statutory power to correct its error once the error and
the potential value of the minerals that it had transferred were discovered. 178
Since DIAND never used this statutory power, even after acquiring the requisite
knowledge of the situation on 9 August 1949, it was held to be in breach of its
fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court found that the Crown was not relieved of
liability for this breach since the Dunne-Za Cree had filed their action on 18
September 1978, which was within the applicable statutory limitation period.
However, while the Dunne-Za Cree were awarded damages for DIAND's breach
of duty, their recovery was limited to sales of mineral rights by DVLA occurring
after 9 August 1949, or only 6.75 sections of the 31 that had been transferred by
DIAND to DVLA in 1948.
For all of its attempts to clarify the problems and contradictions that had existed
in the judgments at trial and upon appeal, the Supreme Court's decision in
Apsassin is, itself, shrouded with self-contradiction. For example, early in his
judgment, Gonthier J. stressed that questions over the legal effects of Crown-
Native dealings relating to reserve land ought to be considered in appreciation
of the sui generis, or unique, nature of aboriginal title, which he said "requires
the courts to go beyond the usual restrictions imposed by the common law, in
order to give effect to the true purpose of the dealings."' 179 Yet, in stressing the
need to consider the context of the surrenders, Gonthier J. ignored this same
premise when he later explained that the band's intention in the aftermath of the
1945 surrender was evidenced entirely by the terms of the surrender document
and failed to account for aboriginal understandings of that document. 180 As
McLachlin J. pointed out in her judgment, "the finding of the trial judge that the
Band intended to give up all rights in I.R. 172 forever is a legal finding based
on his reading of the wording of the 1945 surrender rather than a finding of fact
178. Ibid., at 232:
Where a party is granted power over another's interests, and where the other
party is correspondingly deprived of power over them, or is "vulnerable", then
the party possessing the power is under a fiduciary obligation to exercise it in the
best interests of the other- Frame v. Smith,
supra, per Wilson J.; and Hodgkinson v. Simms, supra. Section 64 gave to
D.I.A. power to correct the error that had wrongly conveyed the Band's minerals
to the D.V.L.A. The Band itself had no such power, it was vulnerable. In these
circumstances, a fiduciary duty to correct the error lies.
179. Ibid., at 200.
180. Ibid., at 201. Note also his comments, ibid., at 202-3: "As the trial judge found, the con-
sequences of the 1945 surrender were fully explained to the Indians by the local agent
of the DIA during the negotiations ... and as McLachlin J. concludes, the evidence
amply demonstrates the valid assent of the Band members to the 1945 agreement."
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based on the evidence presented at trial." 181 Gonthier J.'s conclusions were
characterised by McLachlin J. as being based on a "weak evidentiary basis on
which to establish and intention. ... In determining something as nebulous as
intention over forty years later one must look to all available sources. '182
The Apsassin decision is also noteworthy for its characterisation of the Crown's
fiduciary duty to aboriginal peoples. On this point, one should consider Gonthier
J.'s statement that "[a]s a fiduciary, the DIA was required to act with reasonable
diligence."1 83 It was accompanied by statements made by McLachlin J. that 'the
duty on the Crown as fiduciary was "that of a man of ordinary prudence in
managing his own affairs"' 184 and that "the Crown's obligation was limited to
preventing exploitive bargains." 185 These statements, taken on their own, are
not entirely accurate appraisals of the nature of a fiduciary's obligations. There
is a significant difference between the nature and extent of a fiduciary's duty to
a beneficiary and the standard of expertise required of that same fiduciary.
A fiduciary's duty to a beneficiary, especially in the context of Crown-Native
relations, extends far beyond the characterisations provided by Gonthier and
McLachlin JJ. in Apsassin. The raison d'etre of fiduciary doctrine demonstrates
this point. .As I explained in "Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of
Understanding," the policy underlying fiduciary doctrine "is focused upon a
desire to preserve and protect the integrity of socially valuable or necessary
relationships which arise from human interdependency." 186. To accomplish this
task, fiduciary doctrine imposes strict standards of conduct upon fiduciaries to
enable beneficiaries to rely on the good faith observance of their fiduciaries'
duties. This strict standard of conduct requires that a fiduciary ascribe to high
standards of morality and selflessness, as reflected in the concept of uberrima
fides, or the "utmost good faith." 187
181. Ibid., at 224.
182. Ibid., at 224, 225.
183. Ibid., at 205.
184. Ibid., at 230.
185. Ibid., at 208.
186. L.I. Rotman, "Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding," (1996), 34
Alta. L. Rev. 821, at 826 (hereinafter "Fiduciary Doctrine")
187. Ibid., at 833. Note also McLachlin J.'s statement, in Apsassin, SCC, supra, note 5 at
209: The person who had ceded power trusts the person to whom the power is ceded
to exercise the power with loyalty and care. This is the notion at the heart of the fidu-
ciary obligation."
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A fiduciary's duty to a beneficiary is, therefore, a duty to act in the latter's best
interests, not merely to ensure that the beneficiary is not exploited. 188 A
fiduciary's obligations to a beneficiary are thus much higher than the standard
suggested in Apsassin and are held to a rigorous standard by the courts. 189
Indeed, these notions were explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in its
discussion of the nature of the Crown's fiduciary duty in the Guerin19 0 and
Sparrow cases.1 9 1 While it may be the case that the courts will not hold a
fiduciary to an unduly high standard of expertise in exercising his or her
fiduciary office, the stringent nature of the fiduciary's obligations would seem
to indicate an obligation on the fiduciary to delegate certain powers or discre-
tions to a more qualified or knowledgeable individual if such delegations are
permissible in a given scenario. In the situations involving the surrender of
aboriginal lands, it is not possible for the Crown to delegate its fiduciary
obligations. However, the fact that the fiduciary obligations exist in such
instances only because the Crown made itself a requisite intermediary in all
transactions of aboriginal lands 192 mitigates against reducing the magnitude of
the Crown's obligations from the fiduciary standard of uberrimafides.
SUMMARY
The foregoing decisions were among the most prominent of judicial decisions
in Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence over the past year. They each raise
important issues of law that transcend their application to the individual cases
in which they were discussed. What may be discerned from them, collectively,
188. This was explicitly recognised by McLachlin J. in Apsassin, SCC, supra, note 5 at 232.
189. Supra, note 186 at 826.
190. Supra, note 56.
191. Supra, note 49. For a more complete discussion of the application of fiduciary doctrine
to relationships between the Crown and aboriginal peoples, see L.I. Rotman, Parallel
Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1996).
192. Indian lands are inalienable except to the Crown or through the Crown as an intermedi-
ary in dealings with third parties. The intention of the Crown and its representatives in
North America to be a requisite intermediary in any transactions of Indian lands origi-
nated in the practice of the American colonies in the seventeenth century, as evidenced
in and continued through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C. 1985, App. II., No. 1,
and the Indian Act. This practice also existed in other parts of the British Empire: see,
for example, R. v. Symonds, [1847] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (N.Z.S.C.), at 391. Currently, the
relevant provisions concerning the surrender of reserve lands are contained within sec-
tions 18(1) and 37-41 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 37. For further discus-
sion and analysis of the surrender requirements contained within the Indian Act, see J.P.
Salembier, "How Many Sheep Make A Flock? An Analysis of the Surrender Provisions
of the Indian Act," [1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 14.
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is that the Canadian judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, has
developed a limited awareness of the need to place aboriginal rights issues in
context prior to engaging in its deliberations. The cases also indicate the
judiciary's growing awareness of the need to provide generous and liberal
interpretations of aboriginal rights issues, including relaxing rules of evidence
in some situations. What the cases also suggest, however, is that there is still a
wide gulf between this recognition and its implementation. The judges do not
yet have a complete map to navigate their way through aboriginal rights issues
in a contextually- and culturally-appropriate manner, only bits and pieces. It
remains to be seen whether they are able to acquire the rest of the pieces,
assemble them together, and, most importantly, be able to interpret the map
when they have finally constructed it.
